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Abstract 
The informal economy was an essential part of the former Communist economies and is now 
an important part of the transition economies in Central and Eastern Europe. Many claim that 
it is growing. This paper will consider the relative size and dynamics of the informal economy 
in different countries during the course of transition, the forms of participation in the informal 
economy and its role in economic and political developments in the region.  In doing so, it 
draws upon one repeated survey: New Democracies Barometer (NDB) for the years 1991, 
1992, 1994, 1996, and 1998.  The paper is divided into six parts: Part 1 introduction, Part 2, 
the informal economy and economic development, Part 4, the structure of participation in 
informal economies, or who is participating and how, Part 5 Subjective economic well-being 
and the informal economy, Part 6 the impact of the informal economy on trust in political and 
social institutions and upon perceptions of corruption, then in Part 7 we end with a 
multivariate model which looks at all these factors and participation in the informal economy.  
The paper covers the following countries: Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, Croatia, FRY, Romania, Bulgaria, Belarus, and Ukraine. For most of these 
countries, we have repeated cross-sectional data between 1991 and 1998 (see 
Methodological Appendix 1). 
Zusammenfassung 
Informelle Wirtschaftsleistung (Schattenwirtschaft) ist auch nach dem Zusammenbruch der 
planwirtschaftlichen Systeme ein zentraler Bestandteil der Transformationsökonomien in 
Zentral- und Osteuropa. Möglicherweise ist dieser  Wirtschaftsbereich heute größer denn je. 
Der vorliegende Aufsatz untersucht die relative Größe und die Dynamiken von 
Schattenwirtschaften in verschiedenen Transformationsstaaten, individuelle 
Beteiligungsformen und stellt die wirtschaftliche, aber auch die soziale Bedeutung der 
Schattenwirtschaft für die Entwicklung dieser Regionen dar. Dafür wird auf die Daten der 
Querschnittserhebungen für die Jahre 1991, 1992, 1994, 1996 und 1998 des New 
Democracy Barometer (NDB) zurückgegriffen. 
Nach einer kurzen Einführung in die Prozesse der Transformation konzentriert sich der 
Aufsatz zunächst auf die Konzeptualisierung und Beschreibung der informellen Ökonomien. 
Daran anschließend wird gezeigt, wie Individuen in unterschiedlicher Form in der 
Schattenwirtschaft beteiligt sind und stellt heraus, welche Bedeutung dies für ihre subjektive 
Wohlfahrt haben kann. Um den Einfluss und die Zusammenhänge der Partizipation an 
informellen Wirtschaften für die Konzepte von Vertrauen in politische und soziale 
Institutionen, aber auch gegenüber Korruption zu zeigen, präsentiert das Papier ein 
multivariates Analysemodell, das die Länder Polen, Tschechien, Ungarn, Slowakei, 
Slowenien, Kroatien, Jugoslawien, Rumänien, Bulgarien, Weißrussland und die Ukraine in 
die Analyse umfasst. Mittels eines multinomialen logistischen Regressionsmodells werden 
die für die Beteiligung im informellen Markt ausschlaggebenden Faktoren untersucht. 
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Executive Summary 
1. This working paper measures the informal economy in transition countries within post-
Communist by means of academic survey research. The database of this working paper 
is the New Democracies Barometer, which was created and developed by two of the 
authors, Christian Haerpfer und Claire Wallace during the first decade of economic 
transition in Central and Eastern Europe. 
2. The research identified the extent of household participation in four different economies: 
the formal economy (work or benefits from the public formal economy) the household 
economy (production for household consumption), the social economy (dependence 
upon favours and help from friends and relatives), and the cash or black economy 
(additional monetized activities). Conceptually, these were distinguished according to the 
extent to which they were monetized or non-monetized and their integration or autonomy 
from the main formal economy.  
3. The three different forms of informal economy are a necessary precondition of economic 
survival of up to 90 percent of all post-Communist households. The vast majority of 
households in Eastern and Central Europe depend upon the informal economy in one 
way or another. At least during the period of economic transition, the participation of a 
given household in one of the informal activities is inevitable in order to survive 
economically.  
4. Most of the post-Communist households do not rely on one single form of economic 
activity. They develop a “portfolio of economies” at the micro-level, combining either 
formal economic activities with informal activities or combining different informal 
economic activities in order to get by.  
5. Of the informal economies, the household subsistence sector is the most important, 
being either of first or second importance in 58% of households in Central- and Eastern 
Europe. In the less successful transition countries, it is even becoming more important 
although in some of the more successful transition countries it is dying out. Post 
communist societies with successful economic transformations like Poland, Czech 
republic or Slovenia show a steep decline of households involved with the household 
economy, societies with failed economic transformation display even an increase of 
impact of the household economy. 
6. That there does seem to be a virtuous circle of high formalization, high trust less 
corruption and economic growth. Along with a vicious circle of informalisation, low trust, 
high corruption, and low growth.  However, trust in institutions, especially political 
institutions was associated with confidence in the government to run the economy.  
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7. That the formal and cash economy are the most integrated forms of economic activity 
and are linked in many ways.  The cash economy is especially important for raising 
incomes and buying consumer goods in order to subsidise life styles. The new and 
important group of entrepreneurs is located almost entirely in the formal economy and in 
the cash economy. 
8. The most autonomous and least integrated forms of household economic behaviour are 
the social economy and the household economy. Increasing dependence on these 
economies in these countries is associated with older, poorer people and those in 
peripheral areas.  It leads very often to withdrawal from public and social life.  
9. The household economy as one type of informal economy is autonomous from the formal 
economy, linked with rural areas and almost de-monetized. We found this type of the 
informal economy especially in Romania, Ukraine, and Belarus. 
10. Participation in different economies seems to be associated directly with subjective 
economic well-being (households involved primarily in household economy are 
economically deprived) and on the other hand, it did seem to be associated indirectly 
through the greater access to consumer goods provided by participation in the cash 
economy.  
11. In perspective that is more general: higher levels of formalisation of the economy in the 
transition countries had been associated with higher levels of GDP per capita. 
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Part 1 Introduction 
1.1 Changing economic systems 
The introduction of market reforms in post-communist East Central Europe has lead to the 
creation of a market sector alongside and sometimes replacing to an extent the traditional 
soviet-type state sector. In some countries, reform has been slow and often delayed by 
political inertia whilst others have made obvious progress towards a market-type economy 
with extensive privatisation, even if this often takes the hybrid form of "recombinant" 
ownership (Stark, 1996). The Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary would be examples of 
the latter group. All countries however, have faced rising unemployment, a fall in the number 
of jobs, inflation and the populations have suffered economic privations during the transition 
period. Whilst some seem to have come out of this transition stress relatively well, others 
have not. The growth of a new private sector, including small entrepreneurs along with the 
privatisation of parts of the economy combined with foreign investment, means that there are 
a variety of different kinds of employment available and different kinds of work relation within 
them, although they have not necessarily lead to more jobs; only different kinds of jobs  
(Earle, Frydman, Rapaczynski, & Turkowitz, 1994). 
The informal economy, as an integral part of the former soviet-type command economy 
(Castells & Kiselyova, 1995) has been transformed too. Whereas previously it may have 
operated as a parallel, but symbiotically related partner to the socialist planned economy 
(since it was illegal), major parts of it now resemble more the kinds of tax evasion more 
familiar in the capitalist market-type economy (Sik, 1993). Indeed, some parts of the informal 
economy, such as the street trading or small commodity production have turned into 
legitimate businesses.  
In Table 1, we try to bring together these developments in an overview. A classification of 
economic activities which uses the familiar classification of industrial sectors form the rows of the 
chart: agricultural, industry, services, to which we have added information and culture as an 
important new dynamic sector in post-industrial societies accounting for a major area of growth 
(Lash & Urry, 1994; Castells, 1996). In the columns, we have divided the chart according to 
"economies".  By economies we mean not that each economy is completely separate from one 
another, but rather that they run according to a different economic logic, although all could be 
classified within one overarching economic system.  
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Table 1: Relatioship between different economies 
FORMAL SECTOR        INFORMAL SECTOR 
 
 
 
I State economy II Formal market economy III Informal market economy 
IV Household economy and 
non-monetized exchange 
Primary sector (agriculture) Collective/state farms Independent farmers 
Sale of surplus agricultural 
products at roadside and 
markets 
Food, pigs etc. for household 
consumption (15% of NDB 
families) 
Secondary sector (industry) Many main industries Some privatised industries Sweat shops, industrial home working 
Production of goods e.g. 
Clothes, housing by the 
household 
Tertiary sector (services) Education, health 
Financial services, banking, 
restaurants, plumbers, doctors, 
teachers, prostitutes in official 
private sector 
Plumbers, carpenters, 
prostitutes not paying tax, 
moonlighting doctors and 
teachers, many migrant workers 
Housework, care of elderly, 
childcare (if monetized can be 
done by migrant workers) 
Quartiary sector (Information/ 
Culture) State media, opera, cinema 
Cable TV, satellite, private radio 
stations 
Black market CDs and computer 
software, videos 
Internet communications, 
shareware etc., virtual migrant 
communities 
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First, the state economy is often subject to political control and covers areas of activity, which 
are deemed in the national interest and worthy of state support, even if they do not make a 
profit.  This is part of the formal economy.  It includes collective and state owned farms, state 
owned industries, and education and health in the service sector and state owned media, 
culture, and communications in the quartiary sector. This sector exists in all societies but in 
communist societies, this dominated the economy, as it still does in many post-communist 
societies. The formal market economy includes all those activities and enterprises in the 
formal market sector - that is whose activity forms part of national accounting.  However, 
unlike the state sector, the ultimate criterion is the profit motive (although there may of 
course be state subsidies and there are important overlaps with the state sector).  Thus, this 
would include independent private farmers in the primary sector, privatised and private 
industries in the secondary sector, financial and banking services in the tertiary sector and 
private media, communication and cultural industries in the quartiary sector. In capitalist 
market economies, this is a dominant sector, whilst in post-communist economies it has 
been growing.  
The informal market economy, or cash economy we see as those economic activities, which 
operate according to market principles - i.e. driven by the profit motive - but do not form part 
of national accounts. Hence, these can be the same activities as in the formal market 
economy but which are not part of national accounts or even evade national accounting 
systems.  Such activities include the informal sale of agricultural products, illegal forms of 
industrial employment (perhaps evading labour market regulations as found, for example, in 
the sweat shop industries), services such as the work of plumbers, carpenters as well as 
doctors and teachers "on the side". In the quartiary sector, there is the bootlegging of various 
kinds of cultural products as well as the black market in computer software.   
Finally, the household and social economies include all kinds of economic activities, which 
are not for profit but are exchanged on an informal basis.  Thus, households produce many 
of their own services, either because these have not been drawn into the market economy or 
because the market economy provides the technology for them to be produced at home 
(making yoghurt and jam, growing vegetables, laundry, media entertainment such as video 
and computer games are examples). According to Gershuny and Pahl, the household sector 
is increasing in post-industrial societies rather than declining as more and more household 
services are commercialised and technologies are miniaturized in such a way that they can 
be incorporated as part of the household economy (for example the computer, the video 
player etc) (Gershuny; Gershuny, 1979; Pahl, 1980).   
However, in post-communist societies the household sector remains an important area of 
production for primary needs in the household. Thus, there are two dynamics of 
development in this household and social sector. On the one hand, it represents an archaic 
form of pre-industrial self help, something to which households can retreat when the formal 
economy around them is collapsing or failing to provide for their needs. On the other hand, it 
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represents a site of production and reproduction that is an essential element of 
developments in the post-industrial and information-driven society. The household economy 
in this typology also includes the social economy, including the exchange of information and 
services between households. Such activities normally follow a different economic logic to 
the market or state economies, being carried out for altruism, love, loyalty, duty and so on.  
Here we might include the care of elderly people and children (some of which can also be 
marketized), the production of food and household goods and the in the quartiary sector, the 
many free and exchange services available through communications technologies.  
Many have pointed out that the informal economy does not mean the same thing or cover 
the same kinds of activities everywhere. Rather, it has different functions in different parts of 
the world. Thus, in his discussion of the informal economy, Portes distinguishes three types 
of arrangement (Portes, 1994). The first type is the informal economy as a survival strategy 
and in this sense, it can be found very often in the developing world. The second type is that 
of dependent exploitation in which sub-contracting organizations use informal and illegal 
labour to cut costs. This is found very often in advanced economies, such as New York 
(studied by Portes) but is also described by MacDonald in the UK (MacDonald, 1994). The 
third type is associated more with flexible growth along family enterprise and this he 
attributes to the "Third Italy" (see also Mingione, 1988). In fact, the role and function of the 
informal economy is very different in different contexts. Witness, for example the contrasts 
between the chaotic subsistence activities originally described by Hart in Africa (Hart, 1973), 
the kinds of additional work carried out by moonlighters in the Third Italy at a particularly 
phase of economic development in the 1970s and the self provisioning of households 
described by Pahl in Sheppey (Pahl, 1984). The first two types in Portes' typology can 
certainly be found in Central and Eastern Europe. What is certainly clear is that rather than 
being a universal phenomenon, the informal economy is socially and economically 
embedded - that is, it can take different forms and have different importance in different 
contexts. The question we need to ask therefore is: what kinds of informal economic 
activities are important in Central and Eastern Europe and how are they embedded? 
1.2 Changes between economies 
In most industrial societies, the state sector has been cut back in favour of the formal market 
economy in the trend towards privatisation in recent decades. The state, however, continues 
to regulate the formal market sector, ensuring rules of exchange, contracts, and payments of 
social insurance and labour regulation as well as the collection of taxes for state revenue.  
The rules of economic activity are therefore transparent and legally regulated by national or 
even international law.  In post-communist countries, the state sector has been drastically cut 
back and more activities have moved into the formal market economy. However, the formal 
market economy is always struggling against the informal market economy, driven by profit, 
but governed by different rules and regulations of exchange. It is in the interests of 
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enterprises (in terms of short term profit) to avoid taxation, social regulation and insurance, 
compliance with legal regulations etc.  This is perhaps why many claim that the informal 
economy has been growing (Schneider & Enste, 2000).  The increase in rules and 
regulations and in social insurance payments for the state provides an incentive for 
enterprises to stay outside the state sector. In developed capitalist economies, this is easier 
to do in small enterprises (Castells & Portes, 1989).  Enterprises subject to pressures of 
declining profits, with higher labour costs and under pressure to flexibilize are ones likely to 
go underground (Portes and Sassen Koob 1987, (Mingione, 1988)). Other forms of 
enterprise, which are difficult to control, (such as the sale or sharing of black market 
software) are also likely to be found in this sector. However, in the informal economies, the 
rules of exchange are not transparent. They are not legally regulated. They are subject to 
various forms of private or informal understanding (Portes 1994, Wallace, Shmulyar and 
Bedzir 1999) or they are also subject to criminal control, which can be brutal and violent, as 
when various "Mafia" interests take over.    
In developed capitalist economies, the formal sector is also regulated through institutions of 
civil society such as professional associations, churches, trades unions that help to ensure 
the moral conformity of their members through various kinds of social regulation, which is 
recognized and public. However, the underdevelopment of the independent institutions of 
civil society, which were also deliberately destroyed by the communist regimes in East-
Central Europe, mean that this kind of institutional embedding is also lacking.  
In post-communist countries, the retreat of the state has taken place faster than legislation to 
control market activity could be passed and implemented.  Such legislation is also subverted 
by the agents within the state who are interested in "grabbing" state resources in their own 
interests or tunnelling out state institutions from the inside (Sik, 1994). This means that some 
of the transfer to the market has taken place in the informal market sector.  The absurdity 
and non-viability of much legislation in the transition period (such as very high and 
discouraging taxes on profits, the need for a whole raft of “authorisations” for setting up a 
business) further encourages such transfer along with the tradition of rule bending and 
corruption in communist states (Morawska Ewa, 1998, Wedel 1992). Whilst the household 
and social economies may have grown in developed capitalist societies on account of the 
dynamics described by Pahl, Gershuny and Castells, in Central and Eastern Europe this 
sector has also grown as a result of the economic crisis there. Many households are forced 
back on the resources of friends and relatives and upon growing their own vegetables to 
survive. In other words, it has regressive tendencies. Thus, in post-communist societies, we 
would argue, that the retreat of the state economy along with the inadequacy of the formal 
market economy has lead to a dramatic growth in the informal market economy and in the 
social and household economies. This leads us to the first hypothesis that we wish to test in 
this paper: 
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H1: That there is a changing relationship between formal and informal sectors in Central and 
Eastern Europe. More specifically, as the formal sector declines, so the informal sector 
increases.  
1.3 The consequences of informalisation 
Both Sik and Schneider & Enste have described the deleterious consequences of the failure 
of the formal market economy to take over from the retreat of the state economy. They can 
be summarized as follows: 
1.3a A fiscal crisis of the state 
The state in transition societies is losing revenue from the consequences of the transfer of 
property to the private sector whilst at the same time, the rise in poverty, unemployment and 
so on makes increasing demands on state resources. The failure to be able to collect taxes 
and other revenues as a result of economic activities going underground means that states 
lose still more money. They may respond by increasing the burden of regulation and 
taxation, which may further push activities underground and create a disincentive for 
activities to be formalized.   In the end this could mean the take over of parts of the economy 
by mafia-type organized interests and loss of control by the state where large areas of 
economic activity are not transparently regulated.  
1.3b The undermining of economic indicators 
Where large parts of the economy are unregistered, the government’s ability to estimate GNP, 
inflation and employment is called into question. These indicators, crucial for measuring economic 
performance are rendered very inaccurate or even meaningless. 
1.3c The weakening of social policies 
Where large parts of the economy disappear underground, the revenue necessary to pay for 
social policies such as health, housing, unemployment and pensions benefits are 
unavailable. The consequence is that these benefits are not paid; their staff are underpaid 
and demoralized, leading to an even greater tendency to circumvent the official system with 
unofficial payments and earnings. Furthermore, social policies can be entirely inaccurately 
targeted when the informal economy disguises who is poor and who is really well off.  
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1.3d The distortion of market forces 
A large underground economy distorts the positions of profit and loss in different economic 
enterprises and ventures and changes their relative market positions. This is important in the 
context of privatisation when it is important to know the market position and value of different 
enterprises in order to privatise them successfully. The hidden economy, especially in the 
form of network relations, has undermined much of the privatisation process in Central and 
Eastern Europe whereby an apparently profitable company can have been "tunnelled" out 
and undermined from the inside. In this way, privatisation can actually contribute to the 
growth of the informal economy.    
1.3e The undermining of public morality 
The informal economy can lead to the reinforcement of the tendency to bend and break 
rules, including rising corruption and some examples of super-exploitation (for example by 
not paying the illegal workers) in situations where the rules of exchange are not transparent 
or governed by the rule of law.  In transition countries, Schneider and Enste (2000) show that 
rising corruption is correlated with the informalisation of large sectors of the economy. This 
can lead to either a vicious or a virtuous circle of growth and reform. In the words of one 
study cited by them: 
The wealthier countries of the OECD, as well as some in Eastern Europe, find 
themselves in a 'good equilibrium' of relatively low tax and regulatory burden, sizeable 
revenue mobilization, good rule of law and corruption control, and a (relatively) small 
unofficial economy. By contrast, a number of countries in Latin America and the former 
Soviet Union exhibit characteristics consistent with a 'bad equilibrium': tax and 
regulatory discretion and burden on the firm is high, the rule of law is weak, and there 
is a high incidence of bribery and a relatively high share of activities in the unofficial 
economy (Johnson, Kaufmann and Zoido-Lobaton 1998:1) 
The decline of public morality in turn undermines public confidence in the state and its 
institutions, which are seen as increasingly irrelevant for governing and regulating economic 
activity. This further increases the loss of control of the state over the economic life.   
The formalization of the economy is associated with the institutionalisation of market 
relations regulated by the rule of law. The state has an important role in this, but so do the 
institutions of civil society through consumer protection, professional associations, and so 
on. In a fully institutionalised environment, market exchange is more regularized and 
predictable, backed up by legislation and contracts can be enforced. In other words, this 
associated with formal social capital as we discussed elsewhere (see Nowotny; Raiser; 
Haerpfer and Wallace 2000). However, following from the issues set out above, we might 
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assume that the increasing informalisation of some economic relations might lead to a 
decline in the legitimacy of the public sphere. We can measure this in this case by look at 
levels of trust in public institutions and perceptions of increasing corruption. This leads us to 
our second hypothesis, which is: 
H2: That increasing informalisation is associated with a decline in the legitimacy of the public 
realm. 
1.4 The role of the informal economy in transition countries 
As mentioned already, under some circumstances of transition, the informal (household and 
social) economies can represent the regression to an earlier form of subsistence peasant-
style self-sufficiency as a survival mechanism in post-communist transition societies. For 
many families this is the main way to survive situations where living standards have 
plummeted and many households are left with small or even no incomes. In the former 
Soviet Union in particular, this may be because although there is officially little 
unemployment, wages are often not paid or payments are delayed. For these families there 
can be a downward spiral of greater dependence on the informal economy encouraging a 
further retreat from the formal economy, lack of search for alternatives as families spend all 
their time growing vegetables. This was the outcome of one study of University academics, 
which found that either they developed external networks and became entrepreneurial in 
supplementing their inadequate University salaries or they retreated into working on their 
garden plots as a means of survival.  Those who chose the latter strategy were increasingly 
cut off from professional academic and international networks that might have helped them 
to break out (Müller, Wallace, Chvorostov, & Kovatcheva, 1997).   
However, the informal economy is also often a seedbed for new enterprise as it represents 
new kinds of market type activity, which can provide the capital for more formalized small 
businesses later on (Okolski 2001). It can be the place where entrepreneurial skills are 
practiced and honed and where more "middle class"- aspirations encouraging further 
entrepreneurship are nurtured (Piirainen, 1997). This leads us to ask: is the informal 
economy only part of a survival strategy or is it a source of new wealth?   
One study, carried out as part of the PHARE/ACE-program and investigating the informal 
economy in Romania, tested these propositions. Using a study carried out in the mid 1990s, 
they concluded that the informal economy was important for households at all economic 
levels, but that one group were in what they called a "dependent" situation - they depended 
upon the informal economy in order to supplement their livelihoods.  These were mostly 
poorer manual and less educated people. Another group were in a "dynamic" situation: they 
used the informal economy to create wealth. These were more likely to possess more 
education and professional skills, so that the authors conclude that these may be the 
I H S —Wallace, Haerpfer, Latcheva / The Informal Economy in East-Central Europe 1991-98 — 11 
nucleus of a new entrepreneurial class. A final category were the "improving" group who 
could be found at all social levels, who used the informal economy simply to improve their 
incomes (Duchene, Adair, & Neef, 1998).   
Another study carried out by Timo Piirainen interviewing twenty households in the St. 
Petersburg region twice between 1993 and 1996, argues that it can be both a source of 
survival and as a source of enrichment (Piirainen, 1997). He analyses the situation in terms 
of three economies: the Soviet (state) economy, the market economy, and the informal 
(second) economy. Households straddled one or the other of these. The most vulnerable 
households were dependent only upon the state economy, whilst the most enterprising used 
both the market and the state economy (by having perhaps a family member in both). The 
more traditional households got by with traditional means: the state plus informal economy. 
Piirainen predicts that this will shape the future system of stratification as enterprising 
households become more middle class in their aspirations and life styles.  Richard Rose and 
Christian Haerpfer (1992) describe a similar typology based upon the idea of "portfolios" of 
economies, which include the formal, the social and the "uncivil" or illegal.  
However, these more detailed studies of household activities in the informal economy can 
inform us neither about the different role this plays in different countries, nor about how this 
might have changed over time. The aim of our study therefore is to consider the role of 
households within different economies both comparatively and over time. This leads us to 
our fourth hypothesis: 
H3: That informal economic activity is a form of survival for poor families. OR alternatively, 
that informal economic activity is a form of entrepreneurial enrichment for successful and 
aspiring families. 
1.5 Formalization, Informalisation and economic well-being 
The formalisation of economic activity is more likely where there is growth rather than 
stagnation in the formal economy. We could assume that if more activities come in to the 
public realm, then more money also flows into state coffers leading to a positive rather than a 
negative cycle of reform. We might also associate this with rising levels of subjective 
economic well-being: if reforms are going well, people will feel happier about their own 
situation. On the other hand, subjective well-being and growth might be independently 
associated together. This leads us to our next two hypotheses, which are: 
H4: That economic growth is associated with the formalisation of the economy 
H5: That increasing formalisation is associated with increasing subjective economic well-
being 
12 — Wallace, Haerpfer, Latcheva / The Informal Economy in East-Central Europe 1991-98 — I H S 
 
1.6 Defining and measuring the informal economy 
1.6a How to define the informal economy 
Before we proceed it is necessary to be more specific about what we mean by informal 
economies and how these can be measured. This is important because different authors are 
often talking about quite different things in this discussion. 
The informal economy is a difficult subject to tackle precisely because there are so many 
definitions of it. Sik defines it very simply as "all transactions which are not registered by the 
state are considered to be part of the unregistered economy" (Sik 1995:9). In this he includes 
"smuggling, just as much as domestic work, barter as well as brokerage, reciprocal labour 
exchange and economic corruption, and subsistence farming as well as gambling provided 
they are not covered in official statistics." (Ibid.). This very broad definition avoids the narrow 
issue of tax evasion, which depends upon the particular type of taxation system. Thus, when 
taxes were introduced in Central and Eastern Europe there was tax evasion, thus increasing 
the size of the informal economy even if the activities and transactions had not changed!  
Schneider and Enste (1999) use a typology, which includes both illegal activities and legal 
activities that avoid tax. They divide such activities into non-monetary and monetary 
transactions. On the other hand, Sik produces a typology, which is divided according to the 
following dimensions: Legal and illegal activities, activities which are integrated into the main 
economy or are autonomous (for example, agricultural production for private sale is 
integrated whilst subsistence agricultural production is autonomous); source of income, 
which can be from labour, from position (network capital) or from financial capital (wealth, 
money and production assets) (Sik, 1995). Rose and Haerpfer (1992), on the other hand 
draw up a list of different economies which include: official economy (which is legal, 
monetized), the social economy (which is non-monetized and a-legal (household production, 
help from friends, use of connections) and the uncivil economy (which is illegal and 
monetized) including second economy activities, paying connections and using foreign 
currency. Hence, their dimensions are legality and monetization too. Neef and colleagues on 
the other hand, prefer to exclude the household sector (and this is also the case with most 
economic models) and to concentrate mainly upon the monetized, illegal elements of 
economic activity, which are not recorded.  
What is evident in studying the informal economy is that we need to take into account the 
way in which it is socially embedded in different kinds of economies and in different kinds of 
activities and traditions (Polanyi, 1944; Portes, 1995; Pahl, 1984). 
Our own typology is based upon questions that it is possible to ask in a survey.  Thus, we have 
rejected the legal/illegal distinction because it is not always possible to ask about this in a 
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questionnaire and expect to get honest answers. Furthermore, because laws and regulations are 
changing constantly in the countries with which we are concerned, activities become legal and 
illegal in the process in a manner that is impossible to build into our model. The dimension of 
monetized/non-monetized has been included (since our typology is based upon Rose's original 
questions) and Sik's dimension of integrated and autonomous has been incorporated in a 
modified form. Hence, our typology takes the following form: 
Table 2: Typology of formal and informal work in East-Central Europe 
Level of integration Level of monetization Economic sector Activity 
Integrated Monetized Formal economy Employment/Pension/B
enefit in formal sector 
Semi-integrated Monetized Cash economy 
Getting foreign money, 
earnings from second 
job, incidental earnings 
Semi-Autonomous Non-monetized Social economy 
Obtained as favours, 
help from friends and 
relatives 
Autonomous Non-monetized Household economy Growing own food, repairing housed 
 
Thus, the continuum stretches from integration to autonomy. We assume that the formal 
sector is the most integrated, followed by the cash economy, which is a kind of "shadow" of 
the formal sector. However, we assume that the household economy is the most 
autonomous - it can exist in almost any form of economic organization - whilst the social 
economy is also more or less autonomous and perhaps dependent more upon social 
cohesion in the society than upon economic organization. The success of household 
production, on the other hand, does depend upon access to a plot of land or allotment, which 
is in turn a product of the social and economic organization of the society. 
1.6b How should we measure the informal economy? 
There are three methods for measuring the informal economy: direct approaches, indirect 
approaches and modelling (Schneider & Enste, 2000); Sik, 1995). Each have advantages 
and disadvantages and each tend to come up with different estimations as to the size of the 
informal economy. The most direct method is through the sample survey. However, this is 
likely to under-report the informal economy as respondents may be unwilling to admit to what 
they do. Results are also sensitive to how questions are asked. Furthermore, the complexity 
of informal activities is difficult to grasp in a questionnaire. To this we can add that there are 
in fact two types of questionnaire approach: to ask about activities in the informal economy 
or to ask about consumption (Portes, 1994; Pahl, 1984). The latter is less likely to encourage 
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dishonesty and can give some indication of the volume of informal services. However, it 
cannot tell us who participates in the informal economy as actors.  
Sik (1995) suggests a corrective to the direct survey method through using instead data from 
a household panel survey or time budget data. This tends to provide much more detailed 
information about the informal activities of respondents and could certainly be used to 
measure changes over time. This source is rather under-utilized but the disadvantage is that 
most countries in Central and Eastern Europe do not undertake such surveys on a regular 
basis. However, repeating the sample survey at regular intervals can obviate some of the 
inaccuracies associated with sample surveys. In this way, the stability and the validity of the 
data using the same questions over time can be judged and the level of error reduced. This 
is the reason that we have selected the NDB survey with which to work.  
Another direct method is to look at the discrepancy between income declared for tax 
purposes and that measured by selective checks. However, this is likely to overestimate the 
black economy because the checks are made based on the suspicion of tax evasion.  
None of these methods, according to Schneider and Enste (1999) are able to provide an 
idea of the dynamics and development of the black economy over time. In our opinion, this 
could not be true. The surveys proposed by Sik would in fact solve this problem. The 
problem then is the lack of systematic and comparative surveys of this kind in Central and 
Eastern Europe. However, repeated cross sectional surveys (trend data) such as the New 
Democracies Barometer, which we analyse here can also measure change over time on the 
gross level. In turn, to measure change over time on the net level, we need real panel data, 
i.e. to follow the same sample of people over time.  
The second method is the indirect approach, which involves using various "indicators" for 
measuring the likely effect of the informal economy as tracers. These would include the 
difference between income and expenditure statistics, studies of the labour force, studies of 
the volume of transactions and studies of currency demand, studies of electricity demand, 
including a corrective by Lacko to take into account household electricity consumption. Such 
estimations are very vague and ultimately unsatisfactory (see discussion by Enste and 
Schneider).     
A third approach is to develop models using multiple causes and indicators as well as 
changes over time. Thus, for example estimations of the burden to taxation, the burden of 
regulation and the tax morality of citizens are used to make estimates (see Schneider and 
Enste 2000). Once again, this relies on building in many assumptions and guesses rather 
than real measurements of actual activity. 
A further method, not mentioned in these sources, but used with great efficacy in Central and 
Eastern Europe, is to undertake a qualitative survey in the manner of Piirainen or Neef and 
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colleagues. This has the advantage of being flexible enough to look at a range of different 
kinds of informal activity along with its habitus or the context of such activities and its 
meaning for different social actors. The disadvantage of this is that it is difficult to generalize 
to the population as a whole. Some of these problems are overcome through the use of the 
ethno-survey, which combines qualitative and quantitative techniques and has enabled 
Okolski, for example to estimate the size of the illegal labour force in Poland (Okolski 2001).  
Sik and colleagues have also tried to combine quantitative and qualitative methods in 
measuring the informal economy using detailed observational studies (Czako & Sik, 1999).  
Thus, there are certain innovations in research that are helping to bridge the gap between 
quantitative generalization and qualitative depth but these are as yet not well developed in 
comparative perspective.  
We can conclude then, that there is no very satisfactory method for measuring the informal 
economy. This is compounded in transition countries where the forms of measures which 
make up the indicators are only in the process of development and many parts of the 
economy are unregulated or unmeasured. Furthermore, the measures that exist are often far 
from accurate or they are politically exaggerated. An example of the former would be the 
extraordinarily low - 3.7 percent - official unemployment rate in Ukraine (according to the 
1999 EBRD Transition Report), a country where a large proportion of the workforce are in 
fact not working according to empirical studies (Wallace, 2000; Bedzir, 2000). An example of 
the latter would be the impressive growth recorded in Belarus in the last decade, a country 
that is in reality in a very similar situation to Ukraine and Russia economically. 
1.7 Method of Research 
In our study, we rely mainly upon the direct measures of household economic activity as 
measured by surveys. We can then put them into relation to both subjective indicators such 
as attitudes and to objective indicators such as income, age, and education. We can also 
compare this with aggregate indicators such as GDP per capita and economic performance.  
The disadvantages of such data collection methods have been indicated above. The main 
parameters of the survey are provided in Appendix 1. The main questions we are using to 
construct a household typology of formal and informal activities are a series of questions 
asking about what is the main sources of income for their family - then giving a range of 
alternatives which span the formal economy, household production, social and cash 
economies (details are given in Figure 2). Respondents were then asked what was the 
second most important source of income for their households that enabled us to look at how 
households combined different economies. We then looked at the changes over time and at 
variations between countries as well as the social characteristics of households using 
different economies. The question wording changed slightly between 1991 and 1992 but 
remained the same thereafter. Therefore, caution should be exercised in interpreting data 
from 1991, as it is not strictly comparable.  
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In the first part of the analysis we use only the question: what is the most important source of 
income for the family. However, this underestimates the role of informal economies, which 
are more likely to be supplementary. We therefore go on to redefine the data according to 
the way in which participation in different economies is combined.   
We assume that the information about the formal economic activity, would elicit reasonably 
honest answers as there is no need to conceal this information and it can be corroborated 
with other questionnaire items. The question about household production is also unlikely to 
be concealed and we would assume that this was also reasonably accurate.  The questions 
about the social economy however, are difficult to answer in a simple way because the social 
economy is a good deal more complex than our questions imply. In addition, people may 
want to conceal the fact that they depend upon friends and relatives for help. The questions 
about the social economy are therefore likely to under-estimate the extent of activity in this 
economy. The questions about the cash economy are likewise likely to be an underestimate 
of this kind of activity. People are likely to want to conceal their activities in a cash economy 
from an interviewer and the complexity of such activity is not covered in our questions. To 
sum up, we would assume that whilst we have a reasonably good measure of the formal and 
household economies, we would be under-estimating the social and the black economies in 
our analysis. Nevertheless, the data can give us some indication of activity in these sectors 
and the relative consistency of these data over time indicates that that they are reliable.  
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Part 2 Dimensions of the informal economies 
As described above, one of the better direct measures of the informal economy is household 
activity as measured in repeated cross sectional surveys. Although this underestimates 
informal activity, because people might be reluctant to declare or classify their activities as 
informal, it can give us some indication of the relative importance of the informal economy 
and the changes over time.  Below we begin with some general descriptions of formal and 
informal activities before looking in more detail at who uses different economies and how.  
2.1 Size of the informal sector 
The first indicator we shall consider is the formalization of household activities - that is, the 
extent to which households can survive from their formal jobs. 1 This can give us an indication 
of where and how people find their main jobs insufficient and may be forced to search for 
alternatives. If we look at Figure 1, it shows us the results for 1998. We can see that 
households in Slovenia are the ones most likely to be able to survive on their main jobs, 
followed by the remainder of the Central European countries, with the South Eastern 
European countries and the Eastern European countries more towards the bottom end of the 
scale.  In Ukraine, only 8 percent are able to survive from their main incomes. Anyway, we 
should mention that the interpretation of this variable should be done careful because of the 
many missing values in it  (occasionally about fifty percent and more). If we now consider 
how this indicator has changed over time (Figure 2), we can see that in general, there has 
been a divergence between countries. In 1991 and 1992, they were more closely bunched at 
between 22 and 58 percent, but they now range between 7 and 62 percent. Furthermore, 
there is variation between countries where formalization has been increasing in general 
(Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland) and countries where it has been declining over 
time (Ukraine, Romania, Bulgaria and Croatia). In Belarus, it has stayed more or less the 
same. 
                                                 
1 Question wording: Do you get enough from your main job to buy what you really need?  Definitely enough, just 
enough, not quite enough, definitely not enough 
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Figure 1 People who can live from income from their main job (%)
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Figure 2: Changes in numbers who can live from their main job 1991-1998
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From these data, we would expect the informal sector to be most important in Ukraine, 
Romania, Bulgaria, and Belarus, followed by FRY and Croatia. We would expect it to be 
least important - and indeed declining - in Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland, Hungary and 
Slovenia.  
Furthermore, we can see (Figure 3) that the ability to live from their main income is also very 
highly correlated with GDP per capita. Hence, the GDP per capita is a good indicator of how 
far people might be forced to search for alternative sources of income. However, as we shall 
see, this is not the only indicator of participation in formal and informal economies. 
Figure 3: GDP per Capita and people living from main job 
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Correlation coefficient Pearson's 'r' = 0.779 
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2.2 Second Job 
Another approach is to ask about second jobs. Second jobs are not necessarily indicators of the 
informal economy, however, because the second job could take place in the formal economy. 
Nevertheless, it is an indication of earnings additional to the main formal employment. Here if we 
look at figure 4, we can see that second job holding has declined in all Eastern Central European 
countries except for Slovenia. In general, second job holding was most important among the 
countries of the former Yugoslavia (see table 17 in appendix) and maybe represents their 
propensity towards being guest workers in Europe and the relatively free travel possibilities for the 
nationals from those countries under the former regimes. Except in these countries, second job 
holding is now not very important.  
However, this could be interpreted as a support for the argument of Endre Sik that the second 
economy, characterized by second job holding, is replaced by the informal economy, 
characterized by tax evasion and full time activities (Sik, 1993).    
Figure 4: Changes in second job holiding 1992-1998
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Part 3 Informal economies and economic development 
In this part of the paper, we are testing H2 and the argument that informal economies might 
undermine economic development.  
H2 That institutionalisation of the market economy is associated with economic growth and 
with the formalization of economy 
For this part of the paper, we have taken measures of annual growth as the dependent 
variable measuring economic development. The measure of different economies was the 
percentage of households in the different economies in each country, considering formal, 
household, social and cash economy separately. We then used first bivariate analysis and 
then multivariate OLS-regression to measure the consequences of different kinds of 
economy and different kinds of social capital on economic growth.  
3.1 Consequences of different economies for economic growth 
The results are summarized below: 
Table 3: Correlations between growth and different economies 
 Annual growth 1990-1999 mean 
Households in formal economy .296 
Households in social economy .177 
Households in cash economy -.038 
Households in household economy -.432 
 Pearson's correlation 
Source: NDB 1998 N=12 788, NDB 1996 N=2878, NDB 1994 N=3500 
We can see from Table 3 that the number of households in the formal economy is mostly 
related to economic growth - the more households in the formal economy, the higher the 
growth. The households in the social economy is also correlated with growth – although not 
so strongly. The number of households in the cash economy is negligible and negatively 
correlated with growth, whilst the number of households in the household economy is 
strongly and negatively correlated. In other words, economic growth exists when more 
households move into the formal economy and lack of growth means that more households 
move into the household economy. 
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3.2 Economic conditions in different countries 
We can now turn to the GDP per capita in different countries (in 1998 when the survey was 
carried out) and its relations with different economies. Participation in the social economy 
was negatively correlated with GDP per capita in Lithuania, Latvia and Poland having the 
highest amount of households in the social economy and also relatively low GDP, whilst 
Slovakia, Hungary and the Czech republic had few households in the social Economy but 
high GDP.  
Figure 5: Participation in Social Economy and Growth 
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Correlation coefficient Pearson's 'r' = -0.356 
Households in the household economy were also associated with low GDP (negatively 
correlated). At one extreme, Romania and Ukraine had large numbers of households in the 
household economy and low growth, at the other extreme, The Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary and Croatia had relatively high GDP per capita and fewer households relying upon 
the household economy. 
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The black economy however, was weakly associated with higher GDP. The Czech Republic 
and Hungary had the highest GDP but also fewer people in the black economy. In Croatia, 
by contrast and Estonia there were large numbers in the black economy and relatively high 
GDP. In Russia and Ukraine, growth was low even if the black economy participation rate 
was high. 
Finally, if we turn to the members of households in the formal economy, this is clearly related 
very strongly to GDP per capita. Here there is a clear trend for higher incomes to be 
associated with more people in the formal economy. This stretches from Romania and 
Ukraine as poor countries with low per capita income and fewer people in the formal 
economy to the Czech Republic and Hungary as wealthier countries with more people in the 
formal economy. 
The household and cash economies were all negatively correlated with growth. The 
household economy has a correlation of -.432 with annual growth. Here we can see just the 
opposite patterning of countries than we saw in the case of the formal economy, with Ukraine 
and Romania leading, Slovenia, Czech Republic and Hungary at the other pole and the other 
countries clustered in between. 
Figure 6: Participation in the household economy and economic growth 
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Correlation coefficient Pearson's 'r' = - 0.535 
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Figure 7: Participation in cash economy and economic growth 
Households in Black Economy
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Correlation coefficient Pearson's 'r' = - 0.098 
To return to our two hypotheses 
H2 That institutionalisation of the market economy is associated with economic growth and 
with the formalization of economy 
It does indeed seem to be the case that the institutionalisation of the market economy is 
associated with economic growth and with increasing formalization and decreasing 
informalisation.  However, lower growth and low GDP per capita were associated with more 
people in the household economy. 
3. 3 Conclusions: Informal economies and economic development 
1. Economic growth is associated with increasing formalization  
2. The informal economy most associated with lack of growth is the household economy. 
3. It would seem therefore, that lack of growth leads to a de-monetization of the economy, a 
retreat into the household and social spheres, although the monetized informal (cash) 
economy was perhaps more associated with growth.   
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Part 4 Participation in different economies 
4.1 Typology of Economies:  which economy is most important? 
In each year of the NDB survey, a question was asked about which sources of income were 
most important and which were second most important for the survival of the family2. The 
responses were clustered in four groups according to whether they represented the formal, 
household, social or cash economy. The structure of this typology could be seen in the Table 
4 below.  
Table 4: Typology of Economies* 
FORMAL HOUSEHOLD SOCIAL 
CASH 
(BLACK) 
Earnings of regular job Growing own food What we get as favours Buying goods with foreign money 
Pension, Unemployment 
benefit 
Repairing house What we get with help 
of friends, relatives 
Earnings of second job 
Benefits at place of 
work, such as holidays, 
meals 
  Incidental earnings 
* Data Base: NDB (New Democracy Barometer)  
The category formal economy contains earnings from regular job, pension or benefit and 
benefits from place of work, the household economy include: growing own food and repairing 
house, the social economy: getting favours or help from friends and relatives and the cash or 
black economy: earnings from second job, incidental earnings and getting foreign money3 
(see Rose & Haerpfer, 1992). Respondents were asked what was the first most important 
                                                 
2 Question wording: " Which activity on this card is the most important for the standard of living of you and your 
family? Categories of response: Growing own food/ repairing house/ what we get as favours/what we get with help 
of friends, relatives/ Getting foreign money/Earnings of second job/incidental earnings/earnings of regular 
job/pension, unemployment benefit/benefits at place of work/don't know" . The question was repeated for the second 
most important for the standard of living. 
3 The question wording changed between NDB 1 (1991) and subsequent years.  In NDB 1 it did not include pension 
or state benefits as part of the formal economy. It did not include house repair as part of the household economy 
and the questions about the social economy were worded "help from friends/ free help from connections and for the 
black economy they were worded "Money from connections/ foreign currency dealing" the foreign currency question 
was not included in subsequent NDBs.  
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money source for their households and then what was the second most important, giving us 
different ways to measure this factor. 
The relative importance of each sector for 1998 can be seen in the Figure 8 using the 
question “What is the most important source of income for your household”. In each country 
apart from Romania, the formal economy was the most important source of earnings: in each 
country, it was the main source of income for more than 50 percent of families. The 
household economy was the next most important source and in general: the less the reliance 
on the formal economy, the more is the reliance on the household economy as source of 
income in each country. In Romania, the household economy was the most important source 
of income. The social economy was relatively negligible as a main source of income. The 
cash economy, however, did show some variations. Although low in all countries as a main 
source of income, in Croatia and FRY it was the highest, reaching more than 10 percent of 
households in those countries.  
Figure 8: Most important economy for the household, 1998 
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If we now turn to how this has changed over time using Tables 5 to 8, we can see that in 
terms of the formal economy there are four main clusters of countries. In the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, and Slovenia, it is high (more than 80 percent of households in 1998) 
and has generally been increasing in importance over time. In the second group of countries 
(Slovakia and Poland), it has fluctuated and even declined, standing at around 70 percent in 
1998. In the third group of countries (Bulgaria, Belarus, Croatia, Ukraine, Romania) it is low 
and fluctuating. Although in some of these dependence on the formal economy has declined, 
in some raised, there does not seem to be a stable pattern in those countries. 
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The household economy is very important in Romania, Ukraine, Belarus, and Slovakia 
where its importance has generally increased.  It is also important in Bulgaria, Belarus, and 
Poland.  In the Czech Republic, Slovenia, and Hungary, its importance has declined as the 
importance of the formal economy has grown. In Croatia and FRY, there is not much reliance 
on the household economy. Thus, we could say that the rise of the formal and decline of the 
household economy are successfully linked in some of the most successful transforming 
economies: Czech Republic, Slovenia, and Hungary. Romania, where the household 
economy is most important is among the poorest transforming countries in our sample. 
There is more variation in the social economy, with its importance having increased since 
1992 and declined again since 1996 (with the exception of Ukraine). The importance of the 
cash economy has generally declined in most countries, but remains very important in the 
countries of the former Yugoslavia, perhaps because of the tradition of guest working.  In 
Belarus, Ukraine, and Romania, the cash economy was more important in the early 1990s 
than they are now. This would tend to indicate that increasing economic crisis (inability to live 
from the formal economy) pushes people more into the cash economy and the household 
economy. The cash economy, by contrast is not a substitute for problems in the formal 
economy: it has declined in precisely those countries, which have had the most problems.  
This is also confirmed in the discussion on social capital (see later). 
Table 5: Changes in the Formal economy (percent of households naming it as the 
most important source of household income) 
Country 1991 1992 1994 1996 1998 
NDB mean 65 68 67 70 68 
Czech Republic 72 80 82 88 85 
Hungary 66 80 77 80 83 
Slovenia 66 71 64 59 80 
Slovakia 73 78 80 82 70 
Poland 66 82 82 67 70 
Bulgaria 53 67 67 63 69 
Belarus  71 59 78 64 
Ukraine  26 52 58 57 
Romania 65 61 55 59 46 
Croatia  69 66 71 69 
FRY     68 
(Percent change is measured only between 1992 and 1998 because of the differences in recording data in 1991). 
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Table 6: Changes in the household economy (percent of households naming this as 
the most important source of household income) 
 1991 1992 1994 1996 1998 
NDB mean 26 22 22 21 22 
Czech Republic 21 17 15 9 11 
Hungary 27 16 19 15 14 
Slovenia 30 25 33 37 11 
Slovakia 21 20 15 14 25 
Poland 22 13 12 21 21 
Bulgaria 33 24 22 28 24 
Belarus  14 26 12 26 
Ukraine  59 30 30 33 
Romania 26 26 29 33 47 
Croatia  7 13 11 18 
FRY     16 
(Percent change is measured only between 1992 and 1998 because of the differences in recording data in 1991). 
Table 7: Changes in the social economy (percent of households naming this as the 
most important source of household income) 
 1991 1992 1994 1996 1998 
NDB mean 3 3 4 3 3 
Czech Republic 1 1 1 1 2 
Hungary 3 1 1 2 1 
Slovenia 2 1 1 1 2 
Slovakia 1 1 2 1 1 
Poland 5 2 3 5 5 
Bulgaria 6 2 3 4 4 
Belarus  4 5 3 4 
Ukraine  10 8 4 3 
Romania 3 3 5 5 2 
Croatia  3 5 5 2 
FRY     2 
(Percent change is measured only between 1992 and 1998 because of the differences in recording data in 1991). 
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Table 8: Changes in the cash economy (percent of households naming this as the 
most important source of household income) 
 1991 1992 1994 1996 1998 
NDB mean 6 7 7 6 6 
Czech Republic 6 7 2 2 2 
Hungary 4 2 3 4 3 
Slovenia 3 3 3 4 7 
Slovakia 5 2 3 3 4 
Poland 8 3 4 7 5 
Bulgaria 8 7 9 5 4 
Belarus  11 10 7 6 
Ukraine  5 10 7 8 
Romania 6 10 11 3 5 
Croatia  21 17 14 10 
FRY     14 
(Percent change is measured only between 1992 and 1998 because of the differences in recording data in 1991). 
4.2 What is the structure of the informal economy? 
As we saw from the work of Piirainen (1997) and Rose and Haerpfer (1992), households 
tend to use a variety of economies in different combinations.  How were these economies 
combined in our sample?  For this purpose, we combined the source of income that was said 
by the respondents to be the most important source with that which was the second most 
important source.  The results are set out in Table 9 below.  
Using this new formulation, we can see from this table that most households combine more than 
one economy.  The numbers who are only in the formal economy are about 10 percent (although 
this appears to be rising). The numbers only in the household or only in the social or cash 
economy are negligible.  Large numbers (about one third of households) combine the formal with 
the household economy or the formal with the cash economy (about one in seven households). 
Around ten percent also combine the household and the formal economy in reverse order.  Even 
where the formal economy is very important, it is usually supplemented by some other kind of 
economy.  In Eastern and Central Europe, the portfolio of economies is the norm rather than the 
exception. 
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Table 9: Combinations of formal and informal economies 
Combinations 1991 1992 1994 1996 1998 Building of new* grouping variables 
Household and household 0,2 4 5 5 6 Household economy 
Household and Social 6 3 2 3 2 Household economy 
Household and Cash 6 3 3 3 4 Black/Cash economy 
Household and Formal 15 11 10 11 11 Household economy 
Social and Household 1 1 1 1 1 Household economy 
Social and Social 0,4 0.4 1 0.3 0.4 Household economy 
Social and Cash 1 1 1 1 1 Black or Cash economy 
Social and Formal 1 1 1 1 1 Household economy 
Cash and Household 1 2 2 1 2 Black/Cash economy 
Cash and Social 1 1 1 1 1 Black/Cash economy 
Cash and Cash 1 1 2 1 1 Black/Cash economy 
Cash and Formal 2 3 3 3 2 Black/Cash economy 
Formal and Household 32 36 33 36 32 Formal economy 
Formal and Social 11 8 9 11 8 Formal economy 
Formal and Cash 14 13 14 13 16 Black/Cash economy 
Formal and Formal 8 11 11 10 13 Formal economy 
* See text below 
Another result from this table is that we can say that around 90 percent of the households  
are active in informal economies as either the most important or second most important 
sources of income, although, this seems to be declining very slightly. In addition, we can 
conclude that around one third of households are primarily dependent upon the informal 
economy (either the household, social or cash forms) in Central and Eastern Europe. The 
stability of these scores over the period surveyed, gives us some confidence in the accuracy 
of this estimation using these sources and methods.  
In order to use most of the information for further analyses we decided to combine the first 
and the second most important sources of income in such a way that it allows us to use 
more information, as compared to when we use only one of these variables. From the 
combinations in table 9, we built new grouping variables (dummies) that looked reasonable 
for the combinations, which the respondents used (see table 9). Further, we pooled the 
categories household economy and social economy because of the small number of cases 
in the social economy category. Thus in the following analyses we used only three types of 
economies: household, informal, and formal.  
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Figure 9: Combination of first and second most important economy for the household 
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As we can see from the figure above, in 1998 the highest percentage of black or cash 
economy is found in Serbia (47%) and Croatia (45%). The cash economy is even more 
important for the households’ living standards in these two countries than the formal 
economy. This result is not surprising considering the situation that the economy of these 
countries was affected by war and typical post-war developments such as a flourishing black 
market. The dominant type of economy for the Romanian respondents is the household and 
social economy (44%). The importance of the formal economy can be observed in the 
Eastern Central European’s most developed countries: Czech Republic (70%), Hungary 
(67%), and Slovenia (63%). These results correspond to the findings of the analyses 
mentioned above, where we used only the first variable (most important for the standard of 
living).  
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4.3 Social Characteristics of Households in Different Economies 
Now let us consider the social characteristics of the households who were mostly in one or 
the other economy.  
4.3a Economic activity and the participation in different economies 
Table 10 shows how various kinds of economic activities are related to the different 
economies. If we start with the social characteristics of the households in the black economy, 
we can conclude that 26% of the respondents in this category were unemployed and in 17% 
of cases, another member of the family was unemployed. In general, if people had 
experienced unemployment, they were more likely to be found in the black or the household 
economies. At the same time, a high percentage of the participants in the black economy 
(57%) were not unemployed either. To be precise, we can find in this group both employed 
and unemployed. Thus, unemployment is associated with participation in informal economies 
but it is not the single factor. Further, the majority of the respondents in the cash economy 
were long-term unemployed (63 percent of this group have been unemployed between 27 
and 52 weeks). Concerning their current employment situation, 43 percent of the 
respondents in the black economy were employed full time, 15 percent were housewives or 
students, and 10 percent were unemployed without any benefits. With respect to the type of 
employer, the majority of the black economy group was those from state enterprises (30%) 
and those who were working new private enterprises (28%). Further, 21 percent were public 
servants and 16 percent worked in privatised enterprises.  
However, unemployment did not seem to make so much difference to the participation in the 
household and social economy. The unemployed were only slightly more likely to be involved 
in self-provisioning. However, being economically inactive in other ways was important for 
participation in the household and social economies: 28 percent were pensioners, with 34 
percent employed full time and with 12 percent housewives and students. People in work 
associated with farms have an important foothold in the household production sector. 
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Table 10: Economic activity and different economies  (1998)* 
Economic Activity Factors Formal Household/Social Black 
Unemployment  (n=10 531) 
Cramer’s V =.106 p<.000  
   
Unemployed self 13 20 26 
Other in family 16 16 17 
No unemployment 71 64 57 
Number of weeks being unemployed (n=3 563) 
Eta =.053; Cramer’s V =.053 p<.031 
   
1-3 weeks 2 3 3 
4 weeks 4 2 3 
5-6 weeks 4 5 4 
7-12 weeks 12 12 11 
13-26 weeks 19 20 17 
27-52 weeks 59 58 63 
Economic Activity (n=10 598) 
Cramer's V=.205 p<000 
   
Employed full time 46 34 43 
Employed part time 3 3 6 
Self employed 4 4 6 
Pensioner employed 2 2 4 
Pensioner 28 28 8 
Unemployed no benefit 3 7 10 
Unemployed with benefit 3 5 5 
Other benefit 4 5 3 
Housewife/student 7 12 15 
Employment sector (n=5 235) 
Cramer’s V=.120 p<000 
   
Public servant, Government agency 20 19 21 
State enterprise 36 34 30 
Privatised enterprise 18 18 16 
New private 20 15 28 
Collective farm 5 8 3 
Independent farmer 1 6 2 
* 100% are summed up within columns for every factor 
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Being employed full time and in state enterprises decreases participation in all alternative 
economies, although part time employment is associated with the cash economy.  
Pensioners are most likely found in the formal or the household economies.  Those in new 
private enterprises are polarized between the formal and the cash economy. 
4.3bPoverty, wealth and different economies 
Table 11 shows that the poorest people are those dependent upon the household economy, 
whilst the wealthiest sections of the population are polarized between the formal and cash 
economies. Wealthy people (fourth quartile) are not very likely to be active in the household 
economy. The same is reflected in our scale of deprivation4. Those respondents, who are 
most likely to be active mainly in the formal or the cash economies, are the least deprived. 
However, the household economy on this table seems to be a way of preventing some 
poorer households from becoming very deprived. 
Table 11: Poverty, wealth, and different economies (1998)* 
 Formal Household/Social Black 
Household Income Quartile (n=7 606) 
Cramer’s V =.100 p<000 
   
First quartile 22 32 18 
Second quartile 25 25 22 
Third quartile 26 24 27 
Fourth quartile 27 19 33 
Destitution scale (n=10 642) 
Cramer’s V=.094 p<000 
   
Never deprived 44 36 45 
1 10 8 10 
2 11 11 11 
3 9 12 10 
4 7 7 6 
5 6 6 5 
6 6 9 6 
7 3 3 3 
8 2 4 2 
9 Often deprived 2 4 2 
                                                 
4Question wording: Sometimes people have to do without things that people usually have. In the past year has your 
household had to do without any of the following: food, heating and electricity, clothes you really need: Often, 
sometimes, rarely, never. The scale was constructed by combining these responses. 
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 Formal Household/Social Black 
Number of consumer goods (n=9 732) 
Cramer’s V=.127 p<000 
   
None 15 24 11 
1 31 34 26 
2 26 24 26 
3 22 15 27 
All four 6 3 10 
* 100% are summed up within columns for every factor 
A similar pattern is found if we look at the number of consumer goods possessed by the 
household. Those dependent upon the household economy have the least consumer goods, 
whilst those dependent upon the formal and the cash economy had the largest number of 
consumer goods - but here the cash economy overtook the formal economy in importance.  
We might assume therefore that whilst the formal economy was used for making a living, the 
cash economy was a way of raising living standards by acquiring consumer goods.  
4.3c Demographic characteristics and typology of economies 
The household and social economies were important for older people, as was the formal 
economy (presumably because many of them rely on their pensions). However, younger 
people were more active in the black economy, especially those between 20 and 40 years of 
age (Table 12). People in the black economy were also more likely to be single. The black 
economy was something found more often in urban areas, whilst the household economy 
was more often found in rural areas.  Those in the black economy were likely to have a 
higher education, whilst those in the household and social economies were not well 
educated.    
Those in the black economy were more likely to want to go abroad and this may reflect the 
fact that they were those with the most prospects, most enterprise and most favourable 
demographic characteristics but it might also reflect the fact that many people in Central and 
Eastern Europe work in another country on a temporary basis.  This is an important way of 
supplementing incomes (Wallace and Stola 2001). 
Concerning gender, the majority in the cash economy were males (54%); females were 
more often to find in the household (57%) and formal economy (56%).   
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Table 12: Demographic characteristics and different economies (1998)* 
 Formal Household/Social Black 
Plans to go abroad (n=8 692) 
Cramer’s V=.166 p<000 
   
Plan to go abroad 36 39 55 
Not planning to go abroad 64 61 45 
Age (n=10 623) 
Eta=187,Cramer’sV=.141 p<000 
   
18-19 4 5 7 
20-29 18 17 27 
30-39 17 17 22 
40-49 19 19 20 
50-59 16 15 14 
60 plus 26 27 10 
Marital status (n=10 587) 
Cramer’s V=.089 p<000 
   
Single 18 18 27 
Married 67 67 65 
Divorced 7 5 5 
Widowed 8 10 3 
Town Size (n=9 732) 
Eta=.034, Cramer’s V=.143 p<000 
   
<5000 37 57 30 
<20000 13 10 14 
<100000 19 14 20 
>100 000 31 19 36 
Number of Children (n=8 747) 
Eta=.062, Cramer’s V=.048 p<000 
   
None 60 59 52 
1 22 21 25 
2 15 16 18 
3 or more 3 4 5 
Education (n=10 621) 
Eta=.055, Cramer’s V=.111 p<000 
   
Elementary 31 42 25 
Vocational 25 25 22 
Secondary 32 27 38 
University 12 6 15 
Number of household members (n=7 769) 
Eta=.088, Cramer’s V=.089 p<000 
   
1 12 12 8 
2 23 26 17 
3 24 21 26 
4 26 22 32 
5 and more 15 19 17 
* 100% are summed up within columns for every factor 
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4.4 Conclusions: patterns of participation in the different economies 
1. Most people are active in the informal economy although this is declining in the most 
successful transition countries. Almost 90 percent of all post-Communist households are 
involved in different degrees in the informal, which is a sign that participation in some form of 
informal economy is a necessary condition for the economic survival of household in 
economic transition. 
2. In rural areas, the household economy is more important because of the availability of 
land, which is a precondition of that type of household behaviour. It is also where the older 
respondents are found and also poorer households. We could assume that this activity is 
also a way of helping poor and elderly people to survive. These are the most autonomous 
households, to a large extent outside of the money economy. In Romania, the household 
economy is of particular importance. Some have termed this the “naturalisation” of the 
economy in Bulgaria and Romania.  
3. The cash economy and the formal economy are the most likely way to build up wealth at 
the household level. This is where the enterprising families are found. These are the most 
integrated households and so it seems that the cash economy is also a form of integration 
linked to the formal economy. The cash economy however, is particularly prevalent in 
particular countries, such as Croatia and Serbia. Younger people are more active in the black 
economy and those who are planning to go abroad. It seems that the cash, monetized 
informal economy is particularly important for improving the consumption level of the 
household, but is not particularly associated with poor households. It is for the better off.  
4. We need to distinguish between different informal economies in order to understand their 
role. Here household self-provisioning has a very different role and a different set of 
participants than the cash or black economy.  
Here we can return to H1.   
H1 That there is a changing relationship between formal and informal sectors in Central and 
Eastern Europe.  More specifically, as the formal state sector declines, so the informal sector 
We can see that it is indeed the case that the more people there are in the formal economy, 
the less in the informal economies. However, sometimes it is the household economy that is 
most important in taking over and under some circumstances, the black economy.  
We can also go back to H3.  
H4: That informal economic activity is a form of survival for poor families.  OR that informal 
economic activity is a form of entrepreneurial enrichment for successful and aspiring 
families. 
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Here we see that for poorer families the household economy is most important. For wealthy 
families, under certain circumstances, the black economy is one way of increasing family 
prosperity. The cash economy is particularly prevalent in particular countries, such as 
Croatia, FRY and Ukraine. However, it does not seem to be such an important option for 
poorer families, which have high barriers to access the cash economy.  Hence both of these 
alternative hypotheses are correct – but for different social groups.  
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Part 5 Subjective economic well-being and 
participation in the informal economies 
Due to a variety of theories and measures of the concept well-being, comparisons of 
economic well-being across post communist countries are often not reliable or at least 
difficult to do. In this chapter, we analyse the factors that predict household’s economic well-
being. Is there a link between subjective economic well-being and participation in different 
economies? 
It is important to notice that we use subjective and not objective measures as indicators for 
economic well-being. The method of analyses used is multiple OLS regression with 
subjective economic well-being as a dependent variable and variables such as participation 
in different economies, age, income, employment status etc. as predictors. An additive index 
for subjective economic well-being was built from three variables, which allow the 
respondents to evaluate their current economic situation: current economic family situation5; 
getting by6 and destitution scale7. Before we report the results of the regression model, we 
look at the mean distribution of the first indicator.  
Figure 10 shows us that about two-thirds of the households in 1998 were still dissatisfied 
with their present economic situation. How does this differ between countries? 
                                                 
5 Question Wording: As for your own household/family, how do you rate its economic situation today? (1=very 
satisfactory; 4=very unsatisfactory) 
6 Question Wording: In the past year, has your family: 1-saved money, 2-just got by, 3-spent some savings, 4-
borrowed money and spent savings 
7 Question Wording: Some people have to do without things that people usually have. In the past year has your 
household had to do without any of the following (food, electricity, clothes you really need): (1=often; 4=never) 
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Figure 10: Current economic family situation in Percent (1998, all 11 countries)* 
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Figure 11 illustrates the findings of the economic well-being indicators in all 11 countries. The 
highest level of dissatisfaction with the current economic family situation is found in Bulgaria 
and Ukraine: 90% of the Bulgarian households and 85% of the Ukrainian in 1998 were 
dissatisfied economically. In addition, the levels of deprivation in these two countries are 
relatively high. More than half of the Ukrainian households (58%) and nearly half (46%) of 
the Bulgarian report that during the past year their family did not get by, i.e. they spent 
savings and borrowed money.  Altogether, 64 percent of households in Ukraine and 36 per 
cent of households in Bulgaria described themselves as often deprived. Only Belarus could 
share to some extent the findings for Ukraine and Bulgaria. These results are reflection of 
the stagnation (politically and economically) being observed in these countries at least until 
1997.  
Getting by and the absence of deprivation are important indicators for welfare but not 
sufficient to produce economic satisfaction. For example, a relatively high percentage of the 
households in Hungary (76%), in Poland (54%), and in The Czech Republic (48%) rate their 
economic situation as bad, but the percent coefficients for deprivation and getting by are 
relatively low. This trend is also observable for Croatia and Serbia: about 75% of the 
households in these countries evaluate their current economic situation as bad, but at the 
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same time they rank low on the deprivation and getting by scale. Thus, it is not just their 
objective situation but perhaps their situation in comparison wi th something else that we 
might need to take into account.   It is likely, for example, that those in Poland, Hungary and 
the Czech Republic have relatively high expectations because they compare themselves to 
their Western neighbours rather than to their Eastern neighbours.  The same could be said 
for Croatia and Serbia, where living standards have sunk due to the after effects of war.  
Figure 11: Current economic family situation, Deprivation and Getting by in Percent 
(NDB, 1998)* 
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Further, we calculated an additive index for household’s economic well-being using the three 
variables explained above and entered the index as dependent variable in a multiple 
regression model. The possible predictors of economic well-being were entered into the 
model in 4 blocks in order to examine which of them contributes substantially to the model’s 
ability to predict the outcome (subjective economic well-being). Thus, in the first step of the 
analyses only participation in the black and household economy are considered as 
predictors, in the second step the variables from step one plus the independent variables 
from block 2 are considered and so forth.  The results are displayed in Table 13.  
42 — Wallace, Haerpfer, Latcheva / The Informal Economy in East-Central Europe 1991-98 — I H S 
 
The regression analysis indicates that participation in black or household/social economy 
has little effect on the subjective economic well-being. For the variable household economy 
the standardized regression coefficient (Beta= .044) is statistically significant but rather 
small. It could be interpreted as indication of the economic deprivation of the households 
involved primarily in household economy compared to those in the formal sector.  If we look 
at the R square coefficient for the first Block we can see that participation in the informal 
sector of the economy can explain only about 1% of the variance in economic well-being.  
The second group of variables (2nd block) seems to have reasonably strong predictive 
power. As a whole, this predictor group explains about 25% (Adj. R square= .253) of the 
variance in economic well-being. The strongest effect shows the variable number of 
consumer goods that a household owns; predictably, the households who possess more 
consumer goods, such as a colour TV, a car etc. are significantly more economically 
satisfied. Citizens who do not have someone to borrow money from see their situation as 
poor, from which we might hypothesise that social support is important for maintaining a 
sense of well-being. As expected, unemployment plays a significant role in predicting 
economic well-being: those who are unemployed also perceive their economic well-being as 
poor (Beta= -.139).  
Social demographic differentiations have a significant but modest effect in predicting 
respondent’s evaluation of the family’s economic conditions. The contribution of this variable 
group for explaining the variance of the dependent variable is 2.7% (R Square 
Change=.027): elderly people, women, families with more children, bigger families and 
predominantly respondents in rural areas are those, who feel disadvantaged in their 
economic welfare. 
Household income classes, as the only predictor in the last block, accounts for 1.6% of the 
variation in economic well-being: as expected, respondents, who have higher incomes are 
also significantly more satisfied with their economic situation. 8 The explained variance in 
economic well-being by the regression model as a whole is round 30% (Adj. R 
Square=.295). 
                                                 
8 There is missing information for the household income quartile in The Czech Republic and Hungary 
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Table 13: Regression Analyses of participation in informal economies on subjective 
economic well-being (all 11 countries) 
 
PREDICTORS Beta Adjusted R square 
R 
Square 
Change 
1. Block Households in black economy* 
Households in household economy*  
n.sig. 
.044 
 
.011 
 
.011 
2. Block Having someone to borrow money from .187   
 N of Consumer goods: colour TV, VCR, Car etc. 
Being unemployed last year 
-.317 
-.139 
 
.253 
 
.242 
3. Block Town size 
Age 
Gender 
N of Children 
Education 
N of Households members 
.132 
.036 
.040 
.117 
n.sig. 
.049 
 
 
 
 
 
.279 
 
 
 
 
 
.027 
4. Block Household Income Quartile -.159 .295 .016 
Source: NDB 1998 
* Dummy variables with households in formal economy as reference category 
Conclusions: consequences of activities in different economies for 
subjective well-being 
1. Here we find that the informal economies are to some extent directly associated with a 
sense of economic well-being. To begin with, economic well-being was not always 
associated with not being deprived: in Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic as well as 
Croatia and Serbia people felt badly off even though they were relatively well off. This raises 
the question: to whom are they comparing themselves and what aspirations do they hold?  
We can assume that economic aspirations in these countries were higher than in other 
countries and the source of comparison was either the wealthier neighbouring countries to 
the West or the more comfortable situation in the past.  
Even income made only a small impact on subjective economic well-being.  
2. However, we do find some factors are associated with subjective well-being. First, having 
someone from whom to borrow money was important and we could take this as an indicator 
of informal social support. Secondly, possessing more consumer goods was important for 
subjective well-being. In this way, we could say that the cash economy was indirectly related 
to economic well-being because it was the way in which such things were accumulated and 
is also associated with having a second job. 
3. Here we can turn to one of our hypotheses: that increasing informalisation is associated 
with loss of subjective well-being. This does not seem to be directly the case because 
participation in different economies made little difference to a sense of well-being. However, 
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subjective well-being is associated with the number of consumer goods and we know 
already that these are augmented through the cash economy. So there is perhaps an indirect 
link between a sense of economic well-being and participation in informal economies.  
Still we can conclude that economic welfare is found as well by households in the formal as in the 
cash economy and privation by households in the household economy. It is a sign that the 
household sector remains an important area of production for primary needs in the household and 
cash economy could be seen as a source of new wealth. 
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Part 6 Trust, corruption and informal economies 
The increasing informalisation of some countries could lead to a loss of trust in public 
institutions and in the public realm generally.   We have tested this by looking at a range of 
questions about trust, dividing them between an index for trust in political institutions and an 
index for trust in social institutions.  We looked to see what effect the participation in different 
economies would have on these two indexes.  Finally, we looked at perceptions of corruption 
to see if informalisation would lead to an increase in perceptions of corruption (see Wallace 
and Haerpfer 2000). 
If we consider the correlation in the correlation table 14 below, we can see that perception of 
corruption is positively associated with participation in the cash economy but negatively with 
participation in the household or social economies. That is, respondents, who are involved in 
the household economy, believe that the corruption level compared to the level during 
communism increased. If respondents perceive corruption in 1998 as decreasing compared 
to communist regime, they tend to trust political and social institutions (r= .231 respectively 
r= .281).  
As expected, trust in social institutions is negatively associated with participation in the cash 
economy, as is trust in political institutions. However, participation in the formal economy is 
associated with more trust in social institutions and especially in political institutions. We 
could say therefore, that participation in the black or cash economy leads to an erosion of 
trust, whilst participation in the formal economy leads to higher levels of trust.   
Table 14: Pearson Correlations between perceived level of corruption, participation in 
different economies and trust in political and social institutions (NDB, 1998) 
 Formal economy 
Household/Soci
al economy 
Cash 
economy 
Corruption now 
compared to 
Communist regime9 
Corruption now compared to 
Communist regime 
n.s -.033**  .029**  
Social trust 
(Trust in social institutions) 
.026** .020* -.047** .231** 
Political trust 
(Trust in political institutions) 
.061** n.s -.066** .281** 
** Correlation is significant at 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
*  Correlation is significant at 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
 
                                                 
9 5-point scale with 1=increased a lot and 5=decreased a lot 
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As a subsequent step of this analysis, we looked for a possible relationship between 
informalisation and trust in public realm, i.e. which factors were most important in predicting 
trust in political and social institutions. The additive indices for trust in political and social 
institutions were used as dependent variables in two separate regression models (see table 
15 and table 16). We used the same predictors for both models and if we look at both tables, 
we can see that these predictors have more explanative power for trust in political institutions 
than for trust in social institutions. Because we were mainly interested in the effects of 
participation in different economies and perceived level of corruption, we first concentrate on 
these results.  
In Table 14 we can see that we have a relatively high level of explained variance for trust in 
political institutions (Adj. R Square=.269 or about 27%). Perceptions of corruption were 
rather important for explaining trust in political institutions. This variable alone accounts for 
round 8% of the variance in political trust. Participation in black economy has significant but 
very small effect whilst faith in the government for solving the economic problems shows one 
of the highest effects in the model (Beta= .228): those who think that it would take years 
before the government solves problems do not trust political institutions. Hence, lack of 
political trust was associated with lack of confidence in politicians to run the economy.  
However, the rating of the current economy shows the most important effect (Beta=.249). It 
was positively associated with political trust – if people think that the politicians are doing a 
good job on the economy, they trust political institutions more.  
If we consider the subjective economic well-being of the households we can conclude: if 
respondents feel economically deprived they tend to mistrust political institutions. Another 
factor that plays substantial role are the expectations about the future economic situation:  as 
expected, those who are skeptic usually do not trust public realm (Beta= -115). 
Socio-demographic characteristics play significant but moderate role. They account for only 
2.2% of the explained variance in the variable political trust. At least, elderly people tend to 
trust government and president more than respondents with higher education and 
respondents who live in bigger cities.   
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Table 15: Regression Analyses of participation in different economies, perceived 
corruption level and economic well being on trust in political institutions10 (all 11 
countries) 
 PREDICTORS Beta Adjusted R square 
R Square 
Change 
1. Block Households in black economy 
Households in household economy  
.033
n.s. .003 .003 
2. Block Corruption now, compared to communist regime .163 .084 .081 
3. Block  
Subjective Economic Well-Being 
Current economic situation compared to 5 years ago 
Economic situation in 5 years compared to now 
 
 -
.046 
 .029 
-.115 
 
 
 
 
 
138 
 
 
 
 
.054 
4. Block Time before content with living standard .037   
 Time before government solves problems .228   
 Current economy rating  .249 .248 .111 
5. Block Age .131   
 Town size .041   
 Education .038 .269 .022 
Source: NDB 1998 
 
 
                                                 
10 Trust in political institutions is an additive index built from the following variables: trust in prime minister, trust in 
the president, and trust in government. Higher scores mean great trust 
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Considering trust in social institutions (see table 16), we found that, our model accounts for 
about 17% (Adj. R Square= .166) of the variance. The importance of the factor subjective 
economic well-being (Beta= -.168) is considerable. If things were going badly for the family, 
they lost trust in social institutions such as police, courts or trade unions.  
Also in this regression model we find a substantial effect of the variable faith in the 
government solving the economic problems quickly – this was negatively associated with 
trust in social institutions. Perceptions of corruption were also important by predicting trust in 
social institutions.  
For both models involvement in black economy has a significant but very moderate effect: 
Households, who are involved primarily in the black economy do not trust as well political as 
social institutions, if compared to households in the formal economy. 
Table 16: Regression Analyses of participation in different economies, perceived 
corruption level, and economic well being on trust in social institutions11 (all 11 
countries) 
 PREDICTORS Beta Adjusted R square 
R Square 
Change 
1. Block Households in black economy 
Households in household economy  
-.039 
  n.s 
 
.002 
 
.002 
2. Block Corruption now, compared to communist regime   .140 .059 .057 
3. Block  
Subjective Economic Well-Being 
Current economic situation compared to 5 years ago 
Economic situation in 5 years compared to now 
 
 -.168 
 .054 
-.067 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.124 
 
 
 
 
 
.066 
4. Block Time before content with living standard     n.s.   
 Time before government solves problems -.156   
 Current economy rating  .102 .156 .033 
5. Block Age    n.s.   
 Town size -.046   
 Education -.074 .166 .010 
Source: NDB 1998 
 
 
                                                 
11 Trust in social institutions is an additive index built from the variables: trust in courts, trust in police, trust in civil 
servants, and trust in trade unions: Higher scores mean great trust 
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Conclusions  
1) We could say that our Hypothesis 3 – that participation in the cash economy was 
associated with lack of confidence in the public realm  - is to some extent confirmed. 
Perceptions of corruption and lack of trust in political and social institutions were all 
correlated with participation in the black economy.  
2) Lack of trust in political institutions was more easily explained, since it was 
associated with perceived corruption, economic well-being and the lack of 
confidence in politicians to manage the economy. 
3) Lack of trust in social institutions was also to some extent associated with lack of 
economic confidence in the government, but also with subjective economic well-
being and participation in the cash economy. 
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Part 7 Multivariate Model of Participation in Different 
Economies 
As we have seen in the analysis until now, numerous households continue to rely on a 
multiplicity of economies, such as non-monetized production within the household and 
second jobs that pay cash and so on. These households cope by managing resources from 
multiple economies.  In this part of the paper, we try to predict the probability of belonging to 
the informal economy sector given series of independent variables.  The method of analyses 
we use is multinomial logistic regression, since our outcome variable is a categorical one12 
and the predictor variables are continuous or categorical. 13  
Table 17 displays the results based on the whole sample. Since we are interested in the 
overall trends for all countries.  The logistic regression model used here incorporates groups 
of independent variables (predictors), which were included into the equation simultaneously. 
The predictors include variables that deal with respondent’s economic activity and the 
economic status of the household, socio-demographic characteristics of the respondents, 
some attitudinal data and the country codes. Further, it is important to mention that not all 
possible predictors were included in the model, since they were not available for every 
country (for instance: town size, household income or number of households number). To be 
precise, the following results are based only on the available data for all 11 countries.  This 
has an essential implication by evaluating the model’s overall fit. 
 In the first two columns (black & household) of Table 17, we show the parameters of a 
model when the participation in the formal economy is used as a reference group.14 Thus, 
the coefficients in the third column (formal) are used at the same time as an evaluation of the 
independent variables. Crucial to the interpretation of logistic regression is the value of exp 
(B), which is an indicator of the change in the odds15 of being a participant in the cash or 
household economy, resulting from a unit change in the predictor. 
A glance at table 17 brings us the relative importance of the different predictors. One of the 
essential factors in predicting the participation in the cash (black) economy is the income 
                                                 
12 The dependent variable is typology of economies with 1=black economy, 2=household, 3=formal 
13 The reason to use logistic regression is the violence of the linearity assumption (the relation between variables is 
linear in the usual regression models). When the outcome variable is dichotomous or categorical, this assumption is 
usually violated. (Field, 2000). In logistic regression, we predict the probability of the dependent variable occurring 
given known values of the independent variable.  
14 When the dependent variable consists three categories, SPSS takes the last category of the dependent variable 
as reference category. The third column in the table was calculated after recoding the dependent variable with 
household economy as reference group. This was done in order to check for variables, which cannot divide the 
groups significantly. 
15 The odds of an event occurring are defined here as the probability of “participating in the cash economy” divided 
by the probability of “participating in the formal economy” 
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source. Namely, the odds for being an employed pensioner or unemployed without benefit 
and being involved in the cash economy are 2.50 respectively 1.97 times higher16 (exp (B)= 
2.498 respectively 1.972) than for those being housewives or students (this category is used 
as a reference category). The odds of being unemployed without benefit and being involved 
in household economy increase by the factor 1.683 (=ca. by 68%). Further, if we consider 
the effect of the variable subjective economic well-being we can conclude that respondents, 
who feel economically deprived are more likely to participate in the household economy 
(exp B=1.048) than those, who report they are better off. This is an indication that many 
respondents who are unemployed and without benefit from the state go back to an earlier 
form of subsistence economy or try to search for second jobs in the shadow economy and 
use these as a survival mechanism. For these families it could be a downward spiral of 
greater dependence on the informal economy encouraging a further retreat from the formal 
economy as families spend all their time growing vegetables. As we saw from some 
analyses above second jobs in East-Central Europe usually take place in the black sector of 
the economy, and earnings additional to those from the main formal employment are in 
general substantial for households’ living standards. If we recollect the percentage of second 
job holding, we can see that 26% of the respondents in East-Central Europe report on 
having a second work next to their main employment (see table 18 in the appendix). If we 
consider the distribution between countries: 42% of the Slovenian respondents, the half of 
the Serbian respondents, and 40% of the Croatian record on having an additional job next to 
their formal employment. The percentage in the other countries varies between 14% in 
Bulgaria and 29% in Poland.  
As next, we consider socio-demographic characteristics as possible predictors for 
involvement in the informal sector of the economy. Gender is a significant predictor for 
participation in the cash economy, even its effect is negligible: the odds of being male and 
active in the cash sector increase with 38% (exp B=1.38) than the odds for the females. As 
we have already seen in the previous parts of this paper, the older people are more likely to 
be active in the formal or in the household economy. In this model, the effect of age is 
available for the formal economy (exp B= .911). Respondents with completed elementary or 
vocational school are more likely to be active in the household economy (exp B=2.325 
respectively exp B=1.598) compared to those who completed high school. Namely, less 
educated even do not have the chance to search for alternatives in the cash economy 
sector. They depend upon the household economy in order to supplement their livelihoods.  
Since higher educated are more likely to be found in the formal or black sectors of the 
economy, the black sector could be also seen as a seedbed for new enterprise. It represents 
new kinds of marked type activity, which can provide the capital for more formalized activi ties 
later on. It can be the place where more “middle class” aspirations are raised. This group 
                                                 
16 When exp (B) >1 the odds of event occurring increase, when exp (B) <1 the odds of event occurring decrease 
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possess more education and professional skills and therefore is in the so-called “dynamic” 
situation: they use the informal economy to create wealth.  
This finding could be stressed if we add variables, which represent attitudes and opinions as 
predictors for participation in the black economy: Respondents who prefer income by effort, 
i.e. respondents who share individualistic values also being active in the cash economy 
increase compared to those who share collectivistic values (exp B= 1.099). Moreover, those 
who rate the socialist economy as negative are more likely to participate in the black sector 
of the economy than those who rate the previous economic system as positive.  
This brings us to the question, how patriotism is related to involvement in the black economy. 
The odds of those who do not prefer their country to any other also being active in the cash 
economy increase compared to those who find their country worth to live in (exp B=1.087). 
Those who are not proud of country are more likely to participate in the cash economy or 
formal economy than those who do not feel attached to their country.   
If we consider the effect of the support of undemocratic alternatives, we can conclude that 
authoritarianism is more likely to be found above participants in the formal (state) sector than 
in the informal economy. The odds of those who disagree with authoritarian rule also being 
involved in the cash economy increase (exp B=1.289), compared to those who prefer strong 
leader instead of democracy. This could again underline the notion that respondents involved 
in the cash economy generally support the political and economic reforms in their countries. 
However, some of the transfer to market reforms has taken place in the informal sector along 
with undermining of public morality. 
In order to take into account possible context effects across countries we include the variable 
with the country codes in the model. As we have already seen in the analyses above, the 
distribution of the different types of economies varies across countries. The results from the 
logistic regression model confirm the findings from the descriptive analyses. Croatia and 
Serbia are more likely to be found in the cash economy, Romania in the household economy 
and for the most developed countries like Hungary, Slovenia, Czech Republic, and Poland 
the formal economy is the most important economic sector. 
It is essential to notice once more that not all significant predictors were implied in this model 
since some were not available for all countries.   
The evaluation of the multinomial logistic regression model in table 17 i.e. the models’ 
predictive power could be assessed with McFadden R²- and Nagelkerke R²-values 
(included in the last two rows in the table), which are almost analogous values considering 
their interpretation. The interpretation of these measures is not identical with the R²-value in 
linear regression. The values used here are rather measures of how much the badness-of-fit 
improves because of the inclusion of the predictor variables. They provide a gauge of the 
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substantive significance of the model. Nevertheless, if we consider the less restrictive value 
Nagelkerke R², we can interpret the result as meaning that the model can account for round 
22% (.215) of the variance in participation in different economies. Roughly, a good deal of 
what could explain participation in the informal economy is still unknown. Yet, the analysis 
was useful for giving us an idea of what could be important for explaining this phenomenon 
in Central- and Eastern Europe. 
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Table 17: Predictors of Participation in Different Economies.  A multinomial Logistic 
Regression Model (NDB 1998, all 11 countries) 
Black Economy 
(ref. cat. = formal ec.) 
Household Economy 
(ref. cat. = formal ec.) 
Formal Economy 
(ref. cat. = housh. ec.)        Predictors 
 
Exp (B) Exp (B) Exp (B) 
Income Source  
 
Employed full time 
Employed part time 
Pensioner employed 
Self-employed 
Pensioner 
Unemployed with no benefit 
Unemployed with benefit 
Other benefit 
Housewife/Student (ref. category) 
 
 
.542 
n.sig. 
2.498 
n.sig. 
.246 
1.972 
n.sig. 
.506 
 
 
 
.546 
n.sig. 
n.sig. 
n.sig. 
.583 
1.683 
n.sig. 
n.sig. 
 
 
 
1.830 
n.sig. 
n.sig. 
n.sig. 
1.716 
.594 
n.sig. 
n.sig. 
 
Subjective Economic Well-Being (index) n.sig. 1.048 .955 
Gender  
Male 
Female (ref. category) 
 
1.380 
 
n.sig. n.sig. 
Age .911 n.sig. n.sig. 
Education    
Elementary 
Vocational 
Secondary 
University (ref. category) 
 
.762 
.808 
n.sig. 
 
2.325 
1.598 
1.476 
 
.430 
.626 
.677 
Better strong leader than elections (q24c)** 1.289 .894 n.sig. 
Prefer Income by effort (q35c) 1.099 n.sig. n.sig. 
Being proud of country (q44)* 1.141 n.sig. 1.118 
Prefer this country to any other (q56a)** 1.087 .919 1.088 
Socialist Economy Rating 
negative 
neutral 
positive (ref. category) 
 
1.197 
n.sig. 
 
n.sig. 
n.sig. 
n.sig. 
n.sig. 
Bulgaria n.sig. .722 1.384 
Czech Republic  .728 .373 2.684 
Slovakia n.sig. n.sig. n.sig. 
Hungary n.sig. .362 2.759 
Poland n.sig. .665 1.504 
Romania n.sig. 2.186 .457 
Croatia 2.584 .701 1.426 
Serbia 2.211 .569 1.759 
Slovania n.sig. .374 2.671 
Belarus n.sig. n.sig. n.sig. 
Ukraine (ref.category)    
Nagelkerke R²                                                     .215  
McFadden R²                                                      .102  
 
*1=very proud; 4=not at all proud 
**1=definitely agree; 5=definitely disagree 
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Conclusions: logistic regression model 
The conclusions from the logistic regression model support to some extent those of the 
tables and the binary correlations presented earlier. However, they also point to some 
important differences in the predictive power of the used predictors.  
1) For all countries being unemployed is an important predictor of participation in the 
informal economies. This is essential if we consider the fact that unemployment 
rates within East-Central Europe are quite high. The rise in unemployment and 
poverty makes not only demands on state resources but it leads to greater 
informalisation of the economy. 
2) That informal economic activity is a form of survival for poor families and 
alternatively, that informal economic activity is a form of entrepreneurial enrichment 
for successful and aspiring families. 
3) However, some of the transfer to market reforms has taken place in the cash sector 
of the economy along with internalising individualistic values. 
4) Whilst we could say that in some countries there seems to be a polarisation between 
those involved mainly in the formal and those involved mainly in the informal 
economies (Serbia, Croatia and Romania) in other countries like The Czech 
Republic, Slovenia, Hungary, and Poland the formal economy is the most important 
economic sector. 
However, the general work patterns of the household (or lack of it) was more important than 
other factors for predicting participation in informal economies. This implies that we have to 
see such participation as part of a household work strategy – that is as a way of combining 
the resources of different household members in different ways (Wallace forthcoming). In this 
respect there seems to be some evidence of the emergence of a divide between work-rich 
and work-poor households in terms of prospects, at least in some countries (see Pahl 1984).  
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Methodological Appendix 1 
For the longitudinal survey component an analysis of the New Democracies Barometer 
between 1992 and 1998 was carried out.  This survey, organised by Dr. Christian Haerpfer 
and Professor Richard Rose, involved face to face interviews with a random survey of 1000 
people in each country in the years 1992, 1994, 1996, 1998.  In addition, we drew upon the 
World Values Survey for some questions, another face-to-face international survey 
conducted in two waves: 1990 and 1995-8. Dr. Haerpfer was also the principle investigator in 
one of these surveys of Hungary.  These surveys enable us to compare variables across 
time and between countries in a standardised form.  
New Democracies Barometer 
Established national institutes regularly conducting nationwide representative surveys 
undertake the regular New Democracies Barometer (NDB) surveys.  Until 1998 the Paul 
Lazarsfeld Society in Vienna co-ordinated two survey networks with Central and East 
European affiliates: Fessel GfK and MITROPA.  The Centre merges the ASCII files into a 
multi-national SPSS system file for the Study of Public Policy in Strathclyde.  In addition to 
using ten national languages for the fieldwork, English is the main language of 
communication.   
All interviews are face-to-face, since limited telephone, ownership means that phone 
interviews are not a representative sample.  The basic sampling procedure in each country 
follows the ESOMAR principles of a multi-stage, random probability sample, in which the 
population is stratified regionally and with regions according to urban/rural divisions and town 
size.  One hundred or more primary sampling points (PSU) are drawn.  Within each PSU 
individual respondents are chosen on the basis of standard random procedures in the region 
(see Annex of Central and Eastern Eurobarometer Brussels, European Commission DGX 
No.9, March, 1996). 
Each national survey is checked for representativeness by gender, age, education, region, 
and town size.  Where appropriate, weights are introduced to match the sample to the 
census.  In no case do weights produce major changes in the sample composition or 
responses.  In some countries, samples routinely include respondents from age 15 upwards.  
Where this happens, youthful respondents are excluded from the analysis; this reduces 
slightly responses analysed from the 52940 interviews. All the data reported here are for 
respondents aged 18 and upward. In Croatia and FRY, the war zones are excluded from the 
sample  
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NDB-l Autumn, 1991 
Country Institute, fieldwork 1991 N. interviews 
Bulgaria NAPOC, Sofia, December 1 002 
Czechoslovakia* GfK Prague, November-December 1 034 
Hungary GfK, Budapest, November 1 019 
Poland GfK Warsaw, October 1 193 
Romania IRSOP, Bucharest, December 1 000 
Slovenia Sociology Institute, Ljubljana, Feb-March 1992 1 049 
Austria IFES, Vienna, November 1 954 
 TOTAL INTERVIEWS 8 251 
*A single sample in what was then a single state; responses subdivided to report separate Czech and Slovak 
responses.  
NDB-ll Winter 1992/3 
Country Institute, fieldwork 1991 N. interviews 
Belarus Belarus Public Opinion, Minsk, 23Nov-1Dec 1 225 
Bulgaria Balkan British Social Surveys, Sofia, 5-14 Dec 1 164 
Croatia CEMA/Mitropa, Zagreb, December 1 000 
Czech Republic GfK Prague, November/March 2 waves* 1 408 
Slovakia GfK, Prague Nov/March: 2 waves* 625 
Hungary GfK, Budapest, 13-23 November 970 
Poland GfK Warsaw, 21 Nov-5 Dec 1 113 
Romania IRSOP, Bucharest, December 1 000 
Slovenia Sociology Institute, Ljubljana, Feb-March 1992 1 013 
Ukraine Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, Kiev, Dec 1 000 
 TOTAL INTERVIEWS 10 518 
 
'Two surveys were done in the former Czechoslovakia 10 Nov-7 Dec 1992, and 11 Feb-1 
March 1993, following its break-up.  Since the data showed no significant changes between 
waves, results are pooled for the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic.  
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NDB-lll Winter 1993/4 
Country Institute, fieldwork 1991 N. interviews 
Belarus Sociological Services, Minsk, 23Nov-1Dec 1 000 
 GfK Minsk 5-27 Jan 1 067 
Bulgaria Balkan British Social Surveys, Sofia, 5-14 Dec 1 139 
Croatia CEMA/Mitropa, Zagreb, 15 Jan-15 Feb 1 000 
Czech Republic GfK Prague, 14.31 March 1 167 
Slovakia GfK, Prague 14-31 March 574 
Hungary GfK, Budapest, 19-29 November 1 060 
Poland GfK Warsaw, 26 Nov-3 Dec 1 057 
Romania IRSOP, Bucharest, 13-19 Jan 1 000 
Slovenia Sociology Institute, Ljubljana, 24 Mar-13 April 1 000 
Ukraine SOCIS-Gallup, Kiev 30 Nov-8 Dec 1 000 
 TOTAL INTERVIEWS 11 087 
 
NDB-lV Autumn 1995 
Country Institute, fieldwork 1991 N. interviews 
Belarus Sociological Services, Minsk, 18-27 Nov 1 000 
Bulgaria Balkan British Social Surveys, Sofia,23-2 Nov 1 184 
Croatia CEMA/Mitropa, Zagreb, 13-27 Nov 1 000 
Czech Republic GfK Prague, 1-11 Dec 978 
Slovakia GfK, Prague 7 Nov-18 Dec 1 117 
Hungary GfK, Budapest, 20 Oct-8 November 1 067 
Poland GfK Warsaw, 25 Oct-7 Nov 1 057 
Romania GfK Romania 1-11 Dec 1 038 
Slovenia Sociology Institute, Ljubljana, 1-31 Nov 1 000 
Ukraine SOCIS-Gallup, Kiev 30 Nov-8 Dec 1 000 
 TOTAL INTERVIEWS 10 441 
 
I H S —Wallace, Haerpfer, Latcheva / The Informal Economy in East-Central Europe 1991-98 — 61 
NDB-V Winter/Spring 1998 
Country Institute, fieldwork 1991 N. interviews 
Belarus Sociological Services, Minsk, 4 -28 Feb 1 000 
Bulgaria GfK Bulgaria, Sofia, 16-30 April 1 007 
Croatia Mitropa, Zagreb, 17-31 Mar 1 000 
Czech Republic GfK Prague, 17-27 April 1 017 
Slovakia KMG Bratislava 23 Mar-6 April 1 011 
Hungary GfK, Budapest, 27 Mar-3 April 1 017 
Poland GfK Warsaw, 27 Feb-4 Mar 1 141 
Romania CSOP, Bucharest,7-28 April 1 241 
Slovenia PR+PM Maribor 7-30 April 1 000 
Ukraine SOCIS-Gallup, Kiev 30 March-8 April 1 161 
F.R. Yugoslavia Argument, Belgrade 7-19 Mar 1 000 
Austria IFES, Vienna, 28 Jan-23 Feb 1 048 
 TOTAL INTERVIEWS 12 643 
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Appendix 2 Additional Tables 
Table 18: Second job across countries 
 
 second job
836 86,1 86,1 86,1
135 13,9 13,9 100,0
971 100,0 100,0
814 84,7 84,7 84,7
147 15,3 15,3 100,0
961 100,0 100,0
727 78,8 78,8 78,8
196 21,2 21,2 100,0
923 100,0 100,0
818 84,1 84,1 84,1
155 15,9 15,9 100,0
973 100,0 100,0
816 71,5 71,5 71,5
325 28,5 28,5 100,0
1141 100,0 100,0
950 79,7 79,7 79,7
242 20,3 20,3 100,0
1192 100,0 100,0
597 59,7 59,7 59,7
403 40,3 40,3 100,0
1000 100,0 100,0
504 50,4 50,4 50,4
496 49,6 49,6 100,0
1000 100,0 100,0
569 58,4 58,4 58,4
405 41,6 41,6 100,0
974 100,0 100,0
785 78,5 78,5 78,5
215 21,5 21,5 100,0
1000 100,0 100,0
947 81,6 81,6 81,6
214 18,4 18,4 100,0
1161 100,0 100,0
,00  no
1,00  yes
Total
Valid
,00  no
1,00  yes
Total
Valid
,00  no
1,00  yes
Total
Valid
,00  no
1,00  yes
Total
Valid
,00  no
1,00  yes
Total
Valid
,00  no
1,00  yes
Total
Valid
,00  no
1,00  yes
Total
Valid
,00  no
1,00  yes
Total
Valid
,00  no
1,00  yes
Total
Valid
,00  no
1,00  yes
Total
Valid
,00  no
1,00  yes
Total
Valid
COUNTRYR  Country
2  Bulgaria
3  Czech
4  Slovakia
5  Hungary
6  Poland
7  Romania
8  Croatia
9  Serbia
10  Slovenia
11  Belorus
12  Ukraine
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative
Percent
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Multinominal Regression Model 
Model Fitting Information
18539,843
16633,669 1906,175 60 ,000
Model
Intercept Only
Final
-2 Log
Likelihood Chi-Square df Sig.
 
Goodness-of-Fit
17912,947 17582 ,039
16510,438 17582 1,000
Pearson
Deviance
Chi-Square df Sig.
 
Pseudo R-Square
,186
,215
,102
Cox and Snell
Nagelkerke
McFadden
 
Likelihood Ratio Tests
16633,669 ,000 0 ,
16648,980 15,312 2 ,000
16644,169 10,500 2 ,005
16649,847 16,179 2 ,000
16647,661 13,992 2 ,001
16651,459 17,790 2 ,000
16653,689 20,021 2 ,000
16723,684 90,016 6 ,000
16672,062 38,394 2 ,000
17070,233 436,565 16 ,000
16643,123 9,454 4 ,051
17223,005 589,337 20 ,000
Effect
Intercept
S2COL
ECWELLBE
Q24C
Q35C
Q44
Q56A
S6
S1
Q4
Q15COL
COUNTRYR
-2 Log
Likelihood of
Reduced
Model Chi-Square df Sig.
The chi-square statistic is the difference in -2 log-likelihoods between
the final model and a reduced model. The reduced model is formed
by omitting an effect from the final model. The null hypothesis is that
all parameters of that effect are 0.
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Parameter Estimates
-,597 ,233 6,581 1 ,010
-9,27E-02 ,025 14,271 1 ,000 ,911 ,869 ,956
-8,62E-03 ,016 ,306 1 ,580 ,991 ,962 1,022
-2,71E-02 ,028 ,924 1 ,336 ,973 ,921 1,029
9,402E-02 ,025 13,744 1 ,000 1,099 1,045 1,155
,132 ,037 12,645 1 ,000 1,141 1,061 1,228
8,349E-02 ,030 7,795 1 ,005 1,087 1,025 1,153
-,271 ,099 7,496 1 ,006 ,762 ,628 ,926
-,213 ,093 5,180 1 ,023 ,808 ,673 ,971
-,140 ,085 2,710 1 ,100 ,869 ,735 1,027
0a , , 0 , , , ,
,322 ,055 34,957 1 ,000 1,380 1,240 1,536
0a , , 0 , , , ,
-,613 ,094 42,159 1 ,000 ,542 ,450 ,652
,156 ,153 1,039 1 ,308 1,169 ,866 1,578
,916 ,190 23,312 1 ,000 2,498 1,723 3,623
-3,78E-02 ,141 ,072 1 ,789 ,963 ,730 1,270
-1,402 ,139 101,512 1 ,000 ,246 ,187 ,323
,679 ,140 23,389 1 ,000 1,972 1,497 2,596
-1,77E-02 ,157 ,013 1 ,910 ,982 ,723 1,335
-,681 ,170 16,133 1 ,000 ,506 ,363 ,706
0a , , 0 , , , ,
,180 ,062 8,524 1 ,004 1,197 1,061 1,351
2,262E-02 ,102 ,050 1 ,824 1,023 ,838 1,248
0a , , 0 , , , ,
,170 ,135 1,583 1 ,208 1,185 ,910 1,543
-,318 ,145 4,802 1 ,028 ,728 ,548 ,967
-,157 ,138 1,297 1 ,255 ,855 ,652 1,120
-3,87E-02 ,140 ,077 1 ,782 ,962 ,732 1,265
-,251 ,137 3,344 1 ,067 ,778 ,595 1,018
,219 ,137 2,531 1 ,112 1,244 ,951 1,629
,949 ,140 46,180 1 ,000 2,584 1,965 3,398
,793 ,130 37,383 1 ,000 2,211 1,714 2,851
1,161E-02 ,139 ,007 1 ,934 1,012 ,770 1,330
-,186 ,133 1,943 1 ,163 ,830 ,639 1,078
0a , , 0 , , , ,
-,514 ,253 4,136 1 ,042
-8,48E-03 ,027 ,099 1 ,753 ,992 ,940 1,045
4,652E-02 ,016 8,300 1 ,004 1,048 1,015 1,081
-,112 ,028 16,221 1 ,000 ,894 ,847 ,944
1,769E-02 ,026 ,471 1 ,492 1,018 ,968 1,071
-4,33E-02 ,041 1,120 1 ,290 ,958 ,884 1,038
-8,47E-02 ,035 5,808 1 ,016 ,919 ,858 ,984
,844 ,124 46,565 1 ,000 2,325 1,824 2,962
,469 ,124 14,346 1 ,000 1,598 1,254 2,037
,390 ,119 10,667 1 ,001 1,476 1,169 1,865
0a , , 0 , , , ,
2,347E-04 ,058 ,000 1 ,997 1,000 ,892 1,121
0a , , 0 , , , ,
-,604 ,108 31,215 1 ,000 ,546 ,442 ,676
-,219 ,184 1,411 1 ,235 ,803 ,560 1,153
-8,74E-02 ,232 ,141 1 ,707 ,916 ,581 1,445
-,104 ,170 ,378 1 ,539 ,901 ,646 1,256
-,540 ,138 15,262 1 ,000 ,583 ,444 ,764
,521 ,158 10,833 1 ,001 1,683 1,234 2,295
3,096E-02 ,171 ,033 1 ,857 1,031 ,737 1,443
-8,96E-02 ,164 ,300 1 ,584 ,914 ,663 1,260
0a , , 0 , , , ,
4,069E-02 ,068 ,363 1 ,547 1,042 ,912 1,189
-8,77E-02 ,118 ,556 1 ,456 ,916 ,728 1,153
0a , , 0 , , , ,
-,325 ,133 5,991 1 ,014 ,722 ,557 ,937
-,987 ,152 42,103 1 ,000 ,373 ,276 ,502
-,135 ,131 1,058 1 ,304 ,874 ,676 1,130
-1,015 ,145 49,250 1 ,000 ,362 ,273 ,481
-,408 ,132 9,486 1 ,002 ,665 ,513 ,862
,782 ,124 39,675 1 ,000 2,186 1,714 2,788
-,355 ,153 5,375 1 ,020 ,701 ,520 ,947
-,565 ,153 13,587 1 ,000 ,569 ,421 ,768
-,982 ,159 38,359 1 ,000 ,374 ,274 ,511
-,183 ,126 2,108 1 ,147 ,832 ,650 1,066
0a , , 0 , , , ,
Intercept
S2COL
ECWELLBE
Q24C
Q35C
Q44
Q56A
[S6=1]
[S6=2]
[S6=3]
[S6=4]
[S1=1]
[S1=2]
[Q4=1]
[Q4=2]
[Q4=3]
[Q4=4]
[Q4=5]
[Q4=6]
[Q4=7]
[Q4=8]
[Q4=9]
[Q15COL=-1,00]
[Q15COL=,00]
[Q15COL=1,00]
[COUNTRYR=2]
[COUNTRYR=3]
[COUNTRYR=4]
[COUNTRYR=5]
[COUNTRYR=6]
[COUNTRYR=7]
[COUNTRYR=8]
[COUNTRYR=9]
[COUNTRYR=10]
[COUNTRYR=11]
[COUNTRYR=12]
Intercept
S2COL
ECWELLBE
Q24C
Q35C
Q44
Q56A
[S6=1]
[S6=2]
[S6=3]
[S6=4]
[S1=1]
[S1=2]
[Q4=1]
[Q4=2]
[Q4=3]
[Q4=4]
[Q4=5]
[Q4=6]
[Q4=7]
[Q4=8]
[Q4=9]
[Q15COL=-1,00]
[Q15COL=,00]
[Q15COL=1,00]
[COUNTRYR=2]
[COUNTRYR=3]
[COUNTRYR=4]
[COUNTRYR=5]
[COUNTRYR=6]
[COUNTRYR=7]
[COUNTRYR=8]
[COUNTRYR=9]
[COUNTRYR=10]
[COUNTRYR=11]
[COUNTRYR=12]
TYPOLOGY 
Typology of
Economies
1  black
economy
2 
household
economy
B Std. Error Wald df Sig. Exp(B)
Lower
Bound
Upper
Bound
95% Confidence
Interval for Exp(B)
This parameter is set to zero because it is redundant.a. 
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Parameter Estimates
-8,29E-02 ,284 ,085 1 ,771
-8,42E-02 ,030 7,921 1 ,005 ,919 ,867 ,975
-5,51E-02 ,019 8,633 1 ,003 ,946 ,912 ,982
8,489E-02 ,033 6,648 1 ,010 1,089 1,021 1,161
7,633E-02 ,030 6,274 1 ,012 1,079 1,017 1,146
,175 ,046 14,646 1 ,000 1,192 1,089 1,304
,168 ,038 19,380 1 ,000 1,183 1,098 1,275
-1,115 ,136 67,000 1 ,000 ,328 ,251 ,428
-,682 ,134 25,779 1 ,000 ,506 ,389 ,658
-,530 ,127 17,322 1 ,000 ,589 ,459 ,755
0a , , 0 , , , ,
,322 ,067 23,106 1 ,000 1,380 1,210 1,574
0a , , 0 , , , ,
-8,38E-03 ,115 ,005 1 ,942 ,992 ,792 1,242
,375 ,189 3,957 1 ,047 1,455 1,006 2,106
1,003 ,232 18,657 1 ,000 2,726 1,730 4,298
6,644E-02 ,177 ,141 1 ,707 1,069 ,756 1,511
-,861 ,163 28,060 1 ,000 ,423 ,307 ,581
,158 ,153 1,075 1 ,300 1,171 ,869 1,579
-4,87E-02 ,183 ,071 1 ,790 ,952 ,665 1,364
-,591 ,198 8,947 1 ,003 ,554 ,376 ,816
0a , , 0 , , , ,
,139 ,077 3,311 1 ,069 1,150 ,989 1,336
,110 ,133 ,690 1 ,406 1,117 ,861 1,448
0a , , 0 , , , ,
,495 ,157 9,901 1 ,002 1,640 1,205 2,233
,670 ,182 13,506 1 ,000 1,954 1,367 2,792
-2,24E-02 ,158 ,020 1 ,887 ,978 ,718 1,333
,976 ,173 31,675 1 ,000 2,655 1,889 3,729
,157 ,158 ,995 1 ,319 1,170 ,859 1,595
-,564 ,148 14,529 1 ,000 ,569 ,426 ,761
1,304 ,168 60,121 1 ,000 3,684 2,650 5,123
1,358 ,165 67,741 1 ,000 3,888 2,814 5,372
,994 ,181 30,325 1 ,000 2,702 1,897 3,849
-2,56E-03 ,153 ,000 1 ,987 ,997 ,739 1,346
0a , , 0 , , , ,
,514 ,253 4,136 1 ,042
8,480E-03 ,027 ,099 1 ,753 1,009 ,957 1,063
-4,65E-02 ,016 8,300 1 ,004 ,955 ,925 ,985
,112 ,028 16,221 1 ,000 1,118 1,059 1,181
-1,77E-02 ,026 ,471 1 ,492 ,982 ,934 1,033
4,325E-02 ,041 1,120 1 ,290 1,044 ,964 1,131
8,466E-02 ,035 5,808 1 ,016 1,088 1,016 1,166
-,844 ,124 46,565 1 ,000 ,430 ,338 ,548
-,469 ,124 14,346 1 ,000 ,626 ,491 ,797
-,390 ,119 10,667 1 ,001 ,677 ,536 ,856
0a , , 0 , , , ,
-2,35E-04 ,058 ,000 1 ,997 1,000 ,892 1,121
0a , , 0 , , , ,
,604 ,108 31,215 1 ,000 1,830 1,480 2,262
,219 ,184 1,411 1 ,235 1,245 ,867 1,787
8,736E-02 ,232 ,141 1 ,707 1,091 ,692 1,720
,104 ,170 ,378 1 ,539 1,110 ,796 1,547
,540 ,138 15,262 1 ,000 1,716 1,309 2,251
-,521 ,158 10,833 1 ,001 ,594 ,436 ,810
-3,10E-02 ,171 ,033 1 ,857 ,970 ,693 1,357
8,962E-02 ,164 ,300 1 ,584 1,094 ,794 1,507
0a , , 0 , , , ,
-4,07E-02 ,068 ,363 1 ,547 ,960 ,841 1,096
8,767E-02 ,118 ,556 1 ,456 1,092 ,867 1,374
0a , , 0 , , , ,
,325 ,133 5,991 1 ,014 1,384 1,067 1,796
,987 ,152 42,103 1 ,000 2,684 1,992 3,617
,135 ,131 1,058 1 ,304 1,144 ,885 1,478
1,015 ,145 49,250 1 ,000 2,759 2,078 3,664
,408 ,132 9,486 1 ,002 1,504 1,160 1,950
-,782 ,124 39,675 1 ,000 ,457 ,359 ,583
,355 ,153 5,375 1 ,020 1,426 1,056 1,924
,565 ,153 13,587 1 ,000 1,759 1,303 2,375
,982 ,159 38,359 1 ,000 2,671 1,957 3,645
,183 ,126 2,108 1 ,147 1,201 ,938 1,539
0a , , 0 , , , ,
Intercept
S2COL
ECWELLBE
Q24C
Q35C
Q44
Q56A
[S6=1]
[S6=2]
[S6=3]
[S6=4]
[S1=1]
[S1=2]
[Q4=1]
[Q4=2]
[Q4=3]
[Q4=4]
[Q4=5]
[Q4=6]
[Q4=7]
[Q4=8]
[Q4=9]
[Q15COL=-1,00]
[Q15COL=,00]
[Q15COL=1,00]
[COUNTRYR=2]
[COUNTRYR=3]
[COUNTRYR=4]
[COUNTRYR=5]
[COUNTRYR=6]
[COUNTRYR=7]
[COUNTRYR=8]
[COUNTRYR=9]
[COUNTRYR=10]
[COUNTRYR=11]
[COUNTRYR=12]
Intercept
S2COL
ECWELLBE
Q24C
Q35C
Q44
Q56A
[S6=1]
[S6=2]
[S6=3]
[S6=4]
[S1=1]
[S1=2]
[Q4=1]
[Q4=2]
[Q4=3]
[Q4=4]
[Q4=5]
[Q4=6]
[Q4=7]
[Q4=8]
[Q4=9]
[Q15COL=-1,00]
[Q15COL=,00]
[Q15COL=1,00]
[COUNTRYR=2]
[COUNTRYR=3]
[COUNTRYR=4]
[COUNTRYR=5]
[COUNTRYR=6]
[COUNTRYR=7]
[COUNTRYR=8]
[COUNTRYR=9]
[COUNTRYR=10]
[COUNTRYR=11]
[COUNTRYR=12]
TYPOL
OG2 
Typolog
ie mit
Househ1  black
2 
formal
B Std. Error Wald df Sig. Exp(B)
Lower
Bound
Upper
Bound
95% Confidence
Interval for Exp(B)
This parameter is set to zero because it is redundant.a. 
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